Yahoo Tuning Groups Ultimate Backup tuning Gill's thoughts on Keenan Justness

Responding to ATL #33536 by Dave Keenan:

Dave, I read the thread starting at your ATL # 15836 as you suggested,
and also found your ATL #16006 relevant JI in the context of chords.

J Gill

From ATL #33536 (with quotes and comments added by me):
--- In tuning@y..., "unidala" <JGill99@i...> wrote:

JG:
> Provided that they are (1) musicians, (2) "know" what
> a "fifth" is, (3) are capable of tuning by ear, and (4) are making
> sounds with a (close to) harmonic timbre (where additional "cues"
> exist relative to a strictly "sinusoidal" case.

DK:
Even in the sinusoidal case, nonlinearities in the ear/brain
will generate harmonics, unless the sound is very quiet.

JG: Excellent point, which appears to imply that spectral
energies exist within the final "product" perceived by our
"aural minds" which appear not to be accounted for by many
mathematical descriptions of either musical tones or their
various simultaneous combinations. This measured phenomenon
appears to rather complicate the prospect of constructing
accurate mathematical descriptions of the frequency spectra
actually perceived, when we speak only in terms of tones
(rationally describable, or otherwise) as sinusoidal in
nature only, thus failing to account for timbre due to the
presence of harmonics (externally *or* "internally" generated).

I take it, then, that you confer with the prior conditions of:
provided that they are (1) musicians; and (2) "know" what
a "fifth" is; and (3) are capable of tuning by ear?

JG:
> But what of the many *other* ratios which are commonly
> referred to as "JI" ratios. What of 16/15, 9/8, 10/9, 6/5,
> 5/4, 4/3, 8/5, 5/3, 9/5, 16/9, 15/8? Would you say the
> same about those ratios? What about their strictly sinusoidal
> cases (as opposed to harmonic "cues" being present in the
> tones)? What about the (entirely) "harmonic" case (where
> *all* harmonics of each tone were present)?

DK:
The perceptual definition of just _must_ consider the context.
What is just in one context may not be so in another. ...

JG: Here I add DK's statements in ATL #15836:

<< The important point is that whether or not an interval or chord
is 'justly intoned', is not a mathematical property, it's about
how something _sounds_! >>

<< It may be a "JI tuning" (although most are not) but that
does not make all the intervals it contains "JI intervals". >>

JG: Here I add DK's statement in ATL #16006 relating to chords:

<< I did mean as dyads or I would have said otherwise. But when they
appear in chords, how could you tell if they were consonant, or merely
dissonances in consonant chords? i.e. how can you apportion consonance
among the components of a chord, except by listening to them
separately? But I perceive an otonal chord as more consonant than the
sum of its parts. >>

JG: Followed by the statement:

<< But one can certainly tell if a pitch is justly intoned in the context of a chord, by varying it slightly either way and listening
for beats. >>

JG: In regards to a possible concept of "melodic consonance"
related to "just-ness", DK stated in ATL #16006:

<< I really don't think there is
such a thing as melodic consonance. I _might_ be able to stretch the
concept of justness to pure melody (in which case the claimed ratios
need to be very simple and don't need any great accuracy), but melodic
consonance? >>

It is interesting that such a restriction of the scope
of "consonance" (which makes some sense from a certain
standpoint) seems to differentiate perceptions of
"just-ness" from that of Terhardt's "tonal affinity"
(said to be largely concerned with *consecutive* tones).

JG: Dan Stearn's response to DK's ATL #15836 (in ATL #15841)
appears to raise some interesting points, which speak to the
scope of which the phrase "just intonation" as discussed may
be realistically applied.

DS stated: << all this assumes NO musical context or aesthetic/
artistic intention whatsoever... >>

DS's first point seems to relate to stylistic choice, and
whether the presence of such choices should be considered
to serve to either - qualify music as produced to
(or to disqualify it from) - the status of "just intonation"

<< I mean if I play "Happy Birthday" in octaves at the piano
is it not justly intoned? Is it now "just intonation" music! >>

DS's second point seems to relate to pitch uncertainty in time:
<< Or how about a piece or body of music composed in strict JI
that zips along at a rapid enough clip as to render
even sizable tuning errors all but a moot point...
is this music any less JI than some long drawn-out, easy as pie
musical demonstration of the same justly intoned intervals? >>

JG: DS's second point above raises an issue which upon
consideration would seem to qualify the distinction of
JI to the cases where our "aural minds" have the opportunity
in time to *accurately discern* the relationships between
combinations of tones which are determined by "listening
for beats" (as DK stated in ATL #16006 quoted above). Thus,
one's ability to make a determination of "just-ness" would
appear to be limited by the listening context, requiring
the opportunity to compare a small number of [assumed to
be "complex" (with some/all harmonics present)] tones for
a time period adequate for the resolution of a perception
(however gathered) "purity" and/or "perfectly in tune".

This would seem to restrict the application of such a
definition of the term "just" to those special circumstances
in which the listener is able to make such a (whether it be
subjective, or persuasively objective) determination, and
not necessarily to some examples of such scale-pitches
when combined for short time intervals, where the perceptions
resulting from such scale-pitches combined as "drones" may
not apply in a dynamic musical context of short-duration notes.

JG: In relation to pitch-ratios containing large valued integers,
DK stated in ATL #15836:

<< 12544:9801 isn't any kind of JI interval. Not because it has large
numbers in it, but because it isn't close enough to any ratio with small enough numbers. It might by accident be a consequence of some
JI tuning, but there is no way it could be called a just interval.
You only have to listen to it, and then try varying the pitch
of one of the notes slightly in both directions to hear that
there is nothing "just" about it. >>

<< If an interval "has a quality much like those of tempered (irrational) ratios surrounding it", this is precisely what
defines it as not just! >>

>MS: Possibly one might use capitalization to suggest a difference
>in nuance between a "just" interval (any integer ratio) and a Just
>interval (an interval with a _small_ integer ratio readily tuneable
>by ear by a locking in of partials).

<< No. This would be a complete departure from history. Motivated apparently by mathematics (or numerology) rather than
art or aesthetics.
just = Just = pure = tuneable by ear >>

DK(continued):
If we are asking whether
a particular scale is just, I suggest we accept an interval as just if
it can be tuned by listening for slow beats in any context that can be
provided by the rest of the scale.

JG: By "any context", do you mean (in the most general sense)
"all possible combinations of the *complex* tones of a given
scale with all of the other *complex* tones of that same scale"?

DK:
Then if the scale's
just-interval-graph is connected, (where vertices are the pitches and
edges are the just intervals), I'd call the scale just.

JG: Sounds interesting! Do you have graphic examples of
the "just-interval-graph" of any particular scales?

> JG: When I choose colors in PaintShop Pro, I use what I like,
> as well as what translates in ways that I like to a printed page.
> I do not think about "purity" (though there may be those
> who do). It seems highly subjective to me ...

DK:
It may be simply that no one has ever pointed out to you what pure
colours are. As in "Look at this colour chart. Here are some examples
of pure colours. Now these other ones are colours of the same hue but
different degrees of purity (or saturation). This one is really close
to pure. So now do you get what we mean by "pure"? Do you think this
one is pure?" And so on.

We can do the same thing to teach people what we mean by "just"
for harmony. Maybe twanging a few guitar strings simultaneously and
varing the pitch of one string while saying stuff like "Hear how
there's a sort of beating effect that slows down and then speeds up
again. When it's so slow that you can only tell its there by listening
for longer than any sustained harmonies you intend to use in actual
music, then that's called "just".

JG: So, it appears that you consider that a listening time-
window "longer than any sustained harmonies you intend to use
in actual music" which is (in the least) a long enough time
period within which a listener can perceive whatever
"beating effects" between the tones in question are present
are essential conditions for the "aural mind's" determination
of "just-ness" to take place?

JG:
> But I am more interested in what *you* consider as "pure"
> *sound*.

DK:
Now wait a minute. I'm concerned that you think there is some value
judgment (good/bad) involved in the use of the word "pure" here. There
isn't. In both colour and harmony (note: not merely sound) the word
"pure" has a technical meaning that has very little to do with the
word's common usage. Same for "just". In this context "pure" is simply
a synonym for "just".

JG: But you state (also quoted below within your text):

<< Yes it would be different (simpler) if we were painters. >>

<< We are far from that in modelling perception of harmony. >>

JG:
> Therefore (even with interesting numbers), the nature of the
> (subject-ive) subject of perception seems to preclude us from
> declaring a democratic (statistical) or physical evidentiary
> (speculative conceptual) objective "knowledge claim" in the
> matter. Would it be different (or simpler) if we were painters?

Yes it would be different (simpler) if we were painters. Mathematical
modelling of colour perception is essentially complete and we have
internationally accepted standards based on it. We can now give
precise mathematical specifications of what we mean by particular
colours. Obviously we had to rely on the consensus (or statistical
combination of opinions) of experts to give names to particular
regions of mathematically-modelled colour space.

We are far from that in modelling perception of harmony. The time
dimension seems to make it difficult for one thing. The problem is
that people are trying to give a mathematical definition of "just",
way too early in the piece and failing to recognise the
contradictions they create.

Where do people get this idea that merely because something is
subjective one has to accept that anyone's version of the concept is
as good as anyone elses. This is nonsense.

JG: Perhaps from the inherent paradox of - where our sensory
perceptions are concerned, the "data" gathered, from "square-
one", seems impossible to differentiate from the elements that
our own (subjective) "massaging" and "noise" interject into
the reported "values" of such "data", for whatever reasons.

Therefore, it seems as troublesome to speak of "objectivity"
arrived at by an ongoing "concensus" derived from communications
describing sensory impressions (subjectively) arrived at, where
such a conception of "objectivity" must (inherently) be arrived
at based upon a communicated "agreement" of inherently (subjective)
experiences.

Could we also endeavor to agree on satisfying definitions of
"what it means" to perceive the quality of a sound(s) as being
"soft", "fuzzy", "full", "big", "bouncy", "fat", "rich", "thin"?

DK:
Actually I think it derives
from some of the popular fallacies of post-modernism that ride
roughshod over (or ignore) what has been discovered in hermeneutics.

JG: Hermeneutics? Can you (briefly) define?

JG:
> About "perfectly in tune". Would the agreement enabled by the
> perception of beats between harmonics of the fundamentals be
> as unanimous if there were no overtones to "cue" upon (as in
> the strictly sinusoidal case)?

DK:
No.

JG:
> Ears disagree nevertheless.
> Only those with "good ears" can appreciate the subtle beauty
> which is surely missed with those of "tin ears" (who proceed
> unawares of what they are "missing").

DK:
Yes. The thing is that "good ears" are defined by the fact that they
are by far the largest group that all tend to agree with each other.
The "tin ears" not only don't agree with the "good ears" but they
don't agree with each other either.

JG: Would you then say that "widespread agreement" where it
comes to impressions subjectively gathered constitutes a
workable "objectivity" by virtue of a professed "agreement",
only, without regard for the (subjective) basis of those
impressions? Or, put another way, is an "agreed" meaning
of a "definition" sufficient evidence as to its "objectivity"?

DK:
This is certainly not a foolproof way of defining things or deciding
whether there is "really something there" in general, as our
"democratic" systems of government should make clear. Although a major
problem here is that is that there can probably never be any experts
in "making everybody happy at the same time" and most people are so
far from knowing anything at all about that (or even caring about it),
that it isn't funny.

JG: But, is not an attempt at "defintion" (at least) an attempt
to make "everybody happy at the same time"? Do we not (as "object-
ivists") ultimately judge the (objective) veracity of a "definition"
by the extent to which that condition is approached, and tend to
shun those (what we call "subjective") "definitions" by the extent
to which that condition is *not* approached? Is there not such a
burden placed upon "objective" knowledge claims? We can empathize
with the specialist who may attempt (in vain) to be an expert in
"making everybody happy at the same time", but is that not the
nature of positing "objective knowledge claims" (to attempt to
find a maximal percentage of the population to be in agreement)?

JG:
> Therefore, the sense of
> "objectivity" (relating to "perfect tuning") can only extend
> to those who report sensory acuity exceeding any "democratic"
> population "averages".

DK:
Not those who merely report, but those who form the largest-by-far
community of people who agree with each other (if not on the fine
details at least on the bulk of cases).

JG: Would you abandon your (personal) opinions if you found
yourself outside of a community's populational majority of
perception (if they could *not* hear what you can *clearly* hear)?

JG:
> The "definition" can only be "known"
> by those who *already* "understand". When I am gone, will you
> "know" what I "would have meant" by "perfectly in tune" when
> you "hear it (for) yourself"?

DK:
Not precisely no. But it doesn't matter, because it doesn't depend on
only you.

JG: But if and when - we are *all* gone, and others may choose
different metaphors to identify their perceived "characteristics"
of "purity" and "just-ness", would not the "veracity" of our chosen
definition (arrived at through inherently subjective processes)
appear to have arisen out of *us* (and the metaphors of our
linguistic communications), and not out of the physical events
perceived by us?

> JG: I agree that Nature is indifferent to simplicity,
> and that the "knowledge" we speak of is an "indwelled
> knowledge" accessible only via direct (aural) experience.
>
> It does seem, though, that all "recipes or injunctions"
> must leave room for "personal taste", and in doing so,
> one has no certainty as to the "definition" (of an
> experience) as it exists in the mind of "another".

DK:
Not total certainty, no. But a good enough degree of certainty
nonetheless. Enough to let us "just get on with it".

JG: Would you say the "level of agreement", and the resulting
"senses of certainty" which arise out of tuning list threads
are a good example of just "getting on with it"? Who shall
decide what is a "good enough degree of certainty"? Or, if
such was determined by democratic vote, could those who can
"perceive what others cannot" be said to be included in the
dialog, or marginalized by statistical rules of "good enough"?

JG:
> How would one then ensure that such a "definition"
> would "mean what one had intended it to mean (to others)"?

DK:
The more time we spend listening to harmonies together and dialoguing
with another the more certain we will be.

JG: Seems like a reasonable empirical approach to the
attempted comparison of individual human perceptions
which are personally experienced by those individuals.

But even if all we had was an ancient book describing justness and
there had been no continuity of shared experience. Provided the author
was not genetically radically different (think of colour-blindness) it
could still be communicated injunctively. We'd soon find that "there's
really something there".

JG: This is an exciting prospect. I take it that since you say,
"We'd soon find that 'theres really something there'.", such has
yet, in your viewpoint, to have occured (or do I misunderstand you)?

From your statements above, (my) impression is that:

(1) The determination of the "just-ness" (or "purity") of a
given tone when combined with another tone (or other tones):

(a) requires an listening time-window of sufficient length
to allow for the perception of "beating effects"; and

(b) requires that the listener then "listen for beats".

(2) The determination of "perfectly in tune" may be severely
limited in the case of combinations of sinusoidal tones,
due to "the agreement enabled by the perception of beats
between *harmonics* of the fundamentals" thanks in large
measure to the presence of "overtones" to 'cue' upon.

(3) Similarly, the determination of the presence of "beats"
may be severely limited in the case of combinations of
sinusoidal tones, due to the perception of such "beats"
existing between *harmonics* of the fundamentals due
to the presence of "overtones" to 'cue' upon.

Due to such determinations by a listener of "just-ness"
arising out of special conditions (such as those that exist
when we stop to tune our instruments), and the evident heavy
reliance of the the combined tones in question being "complex"
(with harmonics of the fundamental frequencies involved being
introduced, either externally or "internally"), is it reasonable
to posit that "just-ness" exists a valid descriptor in the
situation of the combination of small numbers of sinusoidal
tones which possess no harmonic energies?

Is it reasonable to posit that "just-ness" exists as a valid
descriptor in the situation where tones (either sinusoidal
or "complex") are *not* present simultaneously for time-windows
which are *not* "longer than any sustained harmonies you intend
to use in actual music"?

Curiously, J Gill

--- In tuning@y..., J Gill <JGill99@i...> wrote:
> Responding to ATL #33536 by Dave Keenan:
>
> Dave, I read the thread starting at your ATL # 15836 as you
suggested,
> and also found your ATL #16006 relevant JI in the context of chords.
>
> J Gill

Dear J,

Thanks for your interest. My apologies for taking so long to reply.

> From ATL #33536 (with quotes and comments added by me):
> --- In tuning@y..., "unidala" <JGill99@i...> wrote:
>
> JG:
> > Provided that they are (1) musicians, (2) "know" what
> > a "fifth" is, (3) are capable of tuning by ear, and (4) are
making
> > sounds with a (close to) harmonic timbre (where additional "cues"
> > exist relative to a strictly "sinusoidal" case.
>
> DK:
> Even in the sinusoidal case, nonlinearities in the ear/brain
> will generate harmonics, unless the sound is very quiet.
>
> JG: Excellent point, which appears to imply that spectral
> energies exist within the final "product" perceived by our
> "aural minds" which appear not to be accounted for by many
> mathematical descriptions of either musical tones or their
> various simultaneous combinations. This measured phenomenon
> appears to rather complicate the prospect of constructing
> accurate mathematical descriptions of the frequency spectra
> actually perceived, when we speak only in terms of tones
> (rationally describable, or otherwise) as sinusoidal in
> nature only, thus failing to account for timbre due to the
> presence of harmonics (externally *or* "internally" generated).
>
> I take it, then, that you confer with the prior conditions of:
> provided that they are (1) musicians; and (2) "know" what
> a "fifth" is; and (3) are capable of tuning by ear?

We could leave off (1).

> JG:
> > But what of the many *other* ratios which are commonly
> > referred to as "JI" ratios. What of 16/15, 9/8, 10/9, 6/5,
> > 5/4, 4/3, 8/5, 5/3, 9/5, 16/9, 15/8? Would you say the
> > same about those ratios? What about their strictly sinusoidal
> > cases (as opposed to harmonic "cues" being present in the
> > tones)? What about the (entirely) "harmonic" case (where
> > *all* harmonics of each tone were present)?

I should have said earlier that, assuming they are intended to represent
intervals (which I'd write as 15:16 etc) these are allm undoubtedly
"JI_system" ratios, which is apparently all that some people mean when they
call them simply "JI". They don't necessarily mean to imply that they can
be tuned by ear. I think this usage is unfortunate.

> DK:
> The perceptual definition of just _must_ consider the context.
> What is just in one context may not be so in another. ...
>
> JG: Here I add DK's statements in ATL #15836:
>
> << The important point is that whether or not an interval or chord
> is 'justly intoned', is not a mathematical property, it's about
> how something _sounds_! >>
>
> << It may be a "JI tuning" (although most are not) but that
> does not make all the intervals it contains "JI intervals". >>
>
>
> JG: Here I add DK's statement in ATL #16006 relating to chords:
>
> << I did mean as dyads or I would have said otherwise. But when they
> appear in chords, how could you tell if they were consonant, or
merely
> dissonances in consonant chords? i.e. how can you apportion
consonance
> among the components of a chord, except by listening to them
> separately? But I perceive an otonal chord as more consonant than
the
> sum of its parts. >>
>
> JG: Followed by the statement:
>
> << But one can certainly tell if a pitch is justly intoned in the
context
> of a chord, by varying it slightly either way and listening
> for beats. >>

Yes. Thanks for reminding me of that.

> JG: In regards to a possible concept of "melodic consonance"
> related to "just-ness", DK stated in ATL #16006:
>
> << I really don't think there is
> such a thing as melodic consonance. I _might_ be able to stretch the
> concept of justness to pure melody (in which case the claimed ratios
> need to be very simple and don't need any great accuracy), but
melodic
> consonance? >>
>
> It is interesting that such a restriction of the scope
> of "consonance" (which makes some sense from a certain
> standpoint) seems to differentiate perceptions of
> "just-ness" from that of Terhardt's "tonal affinity"
> (said to be largely concerned with *consecutive* tones).

Ok.

> JG: Dan Stearn's response to DK's ATL #15836 (in ATL #15841)
> appears to raise some interesting points, which speak to the
> scope of which the phrase "just intonation" as discussed may
> be realistically applied.
>
> DS stated: << all this assumes NO musical context or aesthetic/
> artistic intention whatsoever... >>
>
> DS's first point seems to relate to stylistic choice, and
> whether the presence of such choices should be considered
> to serve to either - qualify music as produced to
> (or to disqualify it from) - the status of "just intonation"
>
> << I mean if I play "Happy Birthday" in octaves at the piano
> is it not justly intoned? Is it now "just intonation" music! >>
>
> DS's second point seems to relate to pitch uncertainty in time:
> << Or how about a piece or body of music composed in strict JI
> that zips along at a rapid enough clip as to render
> even sizable tuning errors all but a moot point...
> is this music any less JI than some long drawn-out, easy as pie
> musical demonstration of the same justly intoned intervals? >>
>
> JG: DS's second point above raises an issue which upon
> consideration would seem to qualify the distinction of
> JI to the cases where our "aural minds" have the opportunity
> in time to *accurately discern* the relationships between
> combinations of tones which are determined by "listening
> for beats" (as DK stated in ATL #16006 quoted above). Thus,
> one's ability to make a determination of "just-ness" would
> appear to be limited by the listening context, requiring
> the opportunity to compare a small number of [assumed to
> be "complex" (with some/all harmonics present)] tones for
> a time period adequate for the resolution of a perception
> (however gathered) "purity" and/or "perfectly in tune".
>
> This would seem to restrict the application of such a
> definition of the term "just" to those special circumstances
> in which the listener is able to make such a (whether it be
> subjective, or persuasively objective) determination, and
> not necessarily to some examples of such scale-pitches
> when combined for short time intervals, where the perceptions
> resulting from such scale-pitches combined as "drones" may
> not apply in a dynamic musical context of short-duration notes.

Yes this is a grey area that I don't really want to get into. Emotions tend
to run high.

> JG: In relation to pitch-ratios containing large valued integers,
> DK stated in ATL #15836:
>
> << 12544:9801 isn't any kind of JI interval. Not because it has
large
> numbers in it, but because it isn't close enough to any ratio with
small
> enough numbers. It might by accident be a consequence of some
> JI tuning, but there is no way it could be called a just interval.
> You only have to listen to it, and then try varying the pitch
> of one of the notes slightly in both directions to hear that
> there is nothing "just" about it. >>
>
> << If an interval "has a quality much like those of tempered
(irrational)
> ratios surrounding it", this is precisely what
> defines it as not just! >>
>
> >MS: Possibly one might use capitalization to suggest a difference
> >in nuance between a "just" interval (any integer ratio) and a Just
> >interval (an interval with a _small_ integer ratio readily
tuneable
> >by ear by a locking in of partials).
>
> << No. This would be a complete departure from history. Motivated
> apparently by mathematics (or numerology) rather than
> art or aesthetics.
> just = Just = pure = tuneable by ear >>
>
>
> DK(continued):
> If we are asking whether
> a particular scale is just, I suggest we accept an interval as just
if
> it can be tuned by listening for slow beats in any context that can
be
> provided by the rest of the scale.
>
> JG: By "any context", do you mean (in the most general sense)
> "all possible combinations of the *complex* tones of a given
> scale with all of the other *complex* tones of that same scale"?

Yes. And if you need to use some unusual timbre to do so, then you should
say so.

> DK:
> Then if the scale's
> just-interval-graph is connected, (where vertices are the pitches
and
> edges are the just intervals), I'd call the scale just.
>
> JG: Sounds interesting! Do you have graphic examples of
> the "just-interval-graph" of any particular scales?

These are just the lattices we normally use, but when you go past the
9-limit you need to look at whether some of the edges need to be deleted
because the necessary otonal context isn't available.

> > JG: When I choose colors in PaintShop Pro, I use what I like,
> > as well as what translates in ways that I like to a printed page.
> > I do not think about "purity" (though there may be those
> > who do). It seems highly subjective to me ...
>
> DK:
> It may be simply that no one has ever pointed out to you what pure
> colours are. As in "Look at this colour chart. Here are some
examples
> of pure colours. Now these other ones are colours of the same hue
but
> different degrees of purity (or saturation). This one is really
close
> to pure. So now do you get what we mean by "pure"? Do you think this
> one is pure?" And so on.
>
> We can do the same thing to teach people what we mean by "just"
> for harmony. Maybe twanging a few guitar strings simultaneously and
> varing the pitch of one string while saying stuff like "Hear how
> there's a sort of beating effect that slows down and then speeds up
> again. When it's so slow that you can only tell its there by
listening
> for longer than any sustained harmonies you intend to use in actual
> music, then that's called "just".
>
> JG: So, it appears that you consider that a listening time-
> window "longer than any sustained harmonies you intend to use
> in actual music" which is (in the least) a long enough time
> period within which a listener can perceive whatever
> "beating effects" between the tones in question are present
> are essential conditions for the "aural mind's" determination
> of "just-ness" to take place?

Well yes, but I'm not insisting that the actual music played, have these
long sustains. It's just the way to prove that a scale or chord or interval
is just.

> JG:
> > But I am more interested in what *you* consider as "pure"
> > *sound*.
>
> DK:
> Now wait a minute. I'm concerned that you think there is some value
> judgment (good/bad) involved in the use of the word "pure" here.
There
> isn't. In both colour and harmony (note: not merely sound) the word
> "pure" has a technical meaning that has very little to do with the
> word's common usage. Same for "just". In this context "pure" is
simply
> a synonym for "just".
>
> JG: But you state (also quoted below within your text):
>
> << Yes it would be different (simpler) if we were painters. >>
>
> << We are far from that in modelling perception of harmony. >>
>
>
> JG:
> > Therefore (even with interesting numbers), the nature of the
> > (subject-ive) subject of perception seems to preclude us from
> > declaring a democratic (statistical) or physical evidentiary
> > (speculative conceptual) objective "knowledge claim" in the
> > matter. Would it be different (or simpler) if we were painters?
>
> Yes it would be different (simpler) if we were painters.
Mathematical
> modelling of colour perception is essentially complete and we have
> internationally accepted standards based on it. We can now give
> precise mathematical specifications of what we mean by particular
> colours. Obviously we had to rely on the consensus (or statistical
> combination of opinions) of experts to give names to particular
> regions of mathematically-modelled colour space.
>
> We are far from that in modelling perception of harmony. The time
> dimension seems to make it difficult for one thing. The problem is
> that people are trying to give a mathematical definition of "just",
> way too early in the piece and failing to recognise the
> contradictions they create.
>
> Where do people get this idea that merely because something is
> subjective one has to accept that anyone's version of the concept is
> as good as anyone elses. This is nonsense.
>
> JG: Perhaps from the inherent paradox of - where our sensory
> perceptions are concerned, the "data" gathered, from "square-
> one", seems impossible to differentiate from the elements that
> our own (subjective) "massaging" and "noise" interject into
> the reported "values" of such "data", for whatever reasons.
>
> Therefore, it seems as troublesome to speak of "objectivity"
> arrived at by an ongoing "concensus" derived from communications
> describing sensory impressions (subjectively) arrived at, where
> such a conception of "objectivity" must (inherently) be arrived
> at based upon a communicated "agreement" of inherently (subjective)
> experiences.
>
> Could we also endeavor to agree on satisfying definitions of
> "what it means" to perceive the quality of a sound(s) as being
> "soft", "fuzzy", "full", "big", "bouncy", "fat", "rich", "thin"?

Quite possibly, but I'm not about to try. :-)

> DK:
> Actually I think it derives
> from some of the popular fallacies of post-modernism that ride
> roughshod over (or ignore) what has been discovered in hermeneutics.
>
> JG: Hermeneutics? Can you (briefly) define?

The study of how we interpret texts. Or how indeed we manage to communicate
at all. Hermes was the mesenger of the gods. It is sometimes taken to be
particularly concerned with interpreting _ancient_ texts, but has become
more general. I understand it is concerned with the entire culture or
community of people who the text was written by or for.

> JG:
> > About "perfectly in tune". Would the agreement enabled by the
> > perception of beats between harmonics of the fundamentals be
> > as unanimous if there were no overtones to "cue" upon (as in
> > the strictly sinusoidal case)?
>
> DK:
> No.
>
>
> JG:
> > Ears disagree nevertheless.
> > Only those with "good ears" can appreciate the subtle beauty
> > which is surely missed with those of "tin ears" (who proceed
> > unawares of what they are "missing").
>
> DK:
> Yes. The thing is that "good ears" are defined by the fact that they
> are by far the largest group that all tend to agree with each other.
> The "tin ears" not only don't agree with the "good ears" but they
> don't agree with each other either.
>
> JG: Would you then say that "widespread agreement" where it
> comes to impressions subjectively gathered constitutes a
> workable "objectivity" by virtue of a professed "agreement",
> only, without regard for the (subjective) basis of those
> impressions? Or, put another way, is an "agreed" meaning
> of a "definition" sufficient evidence as to its "objectivity"?

Subjective/Objective is a false dichotomy. There's a lot of stuff that is
both or neither but requires a _community_ of communicators. It's not
personal or impersonal it's transpersonal, and we couldn't get by without it.

> DK:
> This is certainly not a foolproof way of defining things or deciding
> whether there is "really something there" in general, as our
> "democratic" systems of government should make clear. Although a
major
> problem here is that is that there can probably never be any experts
> in "making everybody happy at the same time" and most people are so
> far from knowing anything at all about that (or even caring about
it),
> that it isn't funny.
>
> JG: But, is not an attempt at "defintion" (at least) an attempt
> to make "everybody happy at the same time"? Do we not (as "object-
> ivists") ultimately judge the (objective) veracity of a "definition"
> by the extent to which that condition is approached, and tend to
> shun those (what we call "subjective") "definitions" by the extent
> to which that condition is *not* approached? Is there not such a
> burden placed upon "objective" knowledge claims? We can empathize
> with the specialist who may attempt (in vain) to be an expert in
> "making everybody happy at the same time", but is that not the
> nature of positing "objective knowledge claims" (to attempt to
> find a maximal percentage of the population to be in agreement)?

Good point.

> JG:
> > Therefore, the sense of
> > "objectivity" (relating to "perfect tuning") can only extend
> > to those who report sensory acuity exceeding any "democratic"
> > population "averages".
>
> DK:
> Not those who merely report, but those who form the largest-by-far
> community of people who agree with each other (if not on the fine
> details at least on the bulk of cases).
>
> JG: Would you abandon your (personal) opinions if you found
> yourself outside of a community's populational majority of
> perception (if they could *not* hear what you can *clearly* hear)?

That's an interesting one. Clearly colour-blind people do this routinely.
They accept that other people can distinguish things that they cannot. They
accept that they are "wrong". Pidgeons have convinced us that they can
distinguish colours that we cannot, but possibly only because we have
instruments (spectrometers) that even outdo the pidgeons.

> JG:
> > The "definition" can only be "known"
> > by those who *already* "understand". When I am gone, will you
> > "know" what I "would have meant" by "perfectly in tune" when
> > you "hear it (for) yourself"?
>
> DK:
> Not precisely no. But it doesn't matter, because it doesn't depend
on
> only you.
>
> JG: But if and when - we are *all* gone, and others may choose
> different metaphors to identify their perceived "characteristics"
> of "purity" and "just-ness", would not the "veracity" of our chosen
> definition (arrived at through inherently subjective processes)
> appear to have arisen out of *us* (and the metaphors of our
> linguistic communications), and not out of the physical events
> perceived by us?

Yes. Certainly. The chosen _metaphors_ may be different but it still seems
likely that the same ear-brain systems would still draw the same
distinctions, whatever they are called, whether anyone ever notices them
and points them out to others is another question.

> > JG: I agree that Nature is indifferent to simplicity,
> > and that the "knowledge" we speak of is an "indwelled
> > knowledge" accessible only via direct (aural) experience.
> >
> > It does seem, though, that all "recipes or injunctions"
> > must leave room for "personal taste", and in doing so,
> > one has no certainty as to the "definition" (of an
> > experience) as it exists in the mind of "another".
>
> DK:
> Not total certainty, no. But a good enough degree of certainty
> nonetheless. Enough to let us "just get on with it".
>
> JG: Would you say the "level of agreement", and the resulting
> "senses of certainty" which arise out of tuning list threads
> are a good example of just "getting on with it"? Who shall
> decide what is a "good enough degree of certainty"? Or, if
> such was determined by democratic vote, could those who can
> "perceive what others cannot" be said to be included in the
> dialog, or marginalized by statistical rules of "good enough"?

A single individual may be able to prove that they can distinguish what the
majority cannot. We'd still have to make a "just getting on with it" kind
of decision about whether to incorporate the abilities of such a minority.
Democratic votes should be a last resort. We should aim for 100% agreement
and eventually people just get tired and say "good enough". This is
"consensus".

> JG:
> > How would one then ensure that such a "definition"
> > would "mean what one had intended it to mean (to others)"?
>
> DK:
> The more time we spend listening to harmonies together and
dialoguing
> with another the more certain we will be.
>
> JG: Seems like a reasonable empirical approach to the
> attempted comparison of individual human perceptions
> which are personally experienced by those individuals.
>
> But even if all we had was an ancient book describing justness and
> there had been no continuity of shared experience. Provided the
author
> was not genetically radically different (think of colour-blindness)
it
> could still be communicated injunctively. We'd soon find that
"there's
> really something there".
>
> JG: This is an exciting prospect. I take it that since you say,
> "We'd soon find that 'theres really something there'.", such has
> yet, in your viewpoint, to have occured (or do I misunderstand you)?

It has probably happened many times.

> From your statements above, (my) impression is that:
>
> (1) The determination of the "just-ness" (or "purity") of a
> given tone when combined with another tone (or other tones):
>
> (a) requires an listening time-window of sufficient length
> to allow for the perception of "beating effects"; and
>
> (b) requires that the listener then "listen for beats".

Yes. But now of course we have to explain what "beats" are, but at least
this seems an easier task.

> (2) The determination of "perfectly in tune" may be severely
> limited in the case of combinations of sinusoidal tones,
> due to "the agreement enabled by the perception of beats
> between *harmonics* of the fundamentals" thanks in large
> measure to the presence of "overtones" to 'cue' upon.
>
> (3) Similarly, the determination of the presence of "beats"
> may be severely limited in the case of combinations of
> sinusoidal tones, due to the perception of such "beats"
> existing between *harmonics* of the fundamentals due
> to the presence of "overtones" to 'cue' upon.

Yes.

> Due to such determinations by a listener of "just-ness"
> arising out of special conditions (such as those that exist
> when we stop to tune our instruments), and the evident heavy
> reliance of the the combined tones in question being "complex"
> (with harmonics of the fundamental frequencies involved being
> introduced, either externally or "internally"), is it reasonable
> to posit that "just-ness" exists a valid descriptor in the
> situation of the combination of small numbers of sinusoidal
> tones which possess no harmonic energies?

I guess so.

> Is it reasonable to posit that "just-ness" exists as a valid
> descriptor in the situation where tones (either sinusoidal
> or "complex") are *not* present simultaneously for time-windows
> which are *not* "longer than any sustained harmonies you intend
> to use in actual music"?

Too many "not"s there with no parentheses. I can't parse this unambiguously.

I'm willing to be fairly liberal in applying the description "just"
provided it is somewhere based on perception rather than merely whole
number ratios. Maybe some time in the future, the mathematical modelling
will be advanced enough so we could give it a purely objective meaning, but
not yet.
-- Dave Keenan
Brisbane, Australia
http://dkeenan.com
When remembering the recent horrific acts of violence, let us not forget
that on September 11th there were 35,000 other very innocent victims.
For that is the number of children dying every day from
starvation-related causes. Where is the global outcry, the unprecedented
coalition, the unlimited resources of money, materials, time and will
dedicated to stopping this daily violence? These children are being
killed by commercial and financial terrorism. There can be no other term
for policies which force the poor to sacrifice their children to pay
compound interest on dubious debts to the rich, while the North refuses
to honour its historical and ecological debts to the South.
Jakob von Uexkull

Gill's thoughts on Keenan Justness

🔗J Gill <JGill99@imajis.com>

🔗unidala <JGill99@imajis.com>

🔗jpehrson2 <jpehrson@rcn.com>

🔗David C Keenan <d.keenan@uq.net.au>