Yahoo Tuning Groups Ultimate Backup metatuning Did the sex question get answered?

Guess it just came up yesterday, in the long thread. Aaron wrote:

"Another example would be closer to male experience, as we referred to it.

I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or 'symbolic'
representation of a thing or a subjective sensation.

Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse exists
that would be so accurate, that you would feel the need to refrain
from losing your virginity? Could such a description, whose existence
is dubious, be calculated by a Turing machine? In other words, you
have *that* little faith in the specialness of the subjective
'first-person' experience and existence?

The affirmative answer would spell death for music, art and poetry (as
we know it, anyway) ;)"

> I missed that question, but I will so answer.

So you are on the record saying that a description of a physical
sensation (or large collection thereof) could be so exacting, so
equivalent to the actual physical sensation(s) that you would feel no
need to experience that actual but instead experience the virtual?

Man, Carl, I sure hope not.

Cheers,
Jon

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 02:04 pm, Jon Szanto wrote:
> C,
>
> Guess it just came up yesterday, in the long thread. Aaron wrote:
>
> "Another example would be closer to male experience, as we referred to it.
>
> I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or 'symbolic'
> representation of a thing or a subjective sensation.
>
> Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse exists
> that would be so accurate, that you would feel the need to refrain
> from losing your virginity? Could such a description, whose existence
> is dubious, be calculated by a Turing machine? In other words, you
> have *that* little faith in the specialness of the subjective
> 'first-person' experience and existence?
>
> The affirmative answer would spell death for music, art and poetry (as
> we know it, anyway) ;)"
>
> > I missed that question, but I will so answer.
>
> So you are on the record saying that a description of a physical
> sensation (or large collection thereof) could be so exacting, so
> equivalent to the actual physical sensation(s) that you would feel no
> need to experience that actual but instead experience the virtual?
>
> Man, Carl, I sure hope not.

I second you, Jon -- it would either mean that Carl has missed out on some
genuinely killer sexual experiences, or that he has, in my estimation, an
overly optimistic and stubborn insistence on the power of symbolic
description !!!!! (I have an instinct that its the latter, not the former,
and that he has had sex, and rather enjoyed it immensely, as any male with a
pulse would.)

Best,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> "Another example would be closer to male experience, as
> we referred to it.
>
> I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or
> 'symbolic' representation of a thing or a subjective
> sensation.

Don't assume that. A process might also be a description.

> Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse
> exists that would be so accurate, that you would feel the
> need to refrain from losing your virginity?

In the brain (and body) of the person losing his or her
virginity, there is no doubt such a definition.

> Could such a description, whose existence is dubious,
> be calculated by a Turing machine?

I believe so.

> In other words, you have *that* little faith in the
> specialness of the subjective 'first-person' experience
> and existence?

Yep.

> The affirmative answer would spell death for music, art
> and poetry (as we know it, anyway) ;)"

Well you know how much I like music (and you might not
know how much you like poetry and art!), so this
obviously isn't true in all cases.

> > I missed that question, but I will so answer.
>
> So you are on the record saying that a description of a
> physical sensation (or large collection thereof) could
> be so exacting, so equivalent to the actual physical
> sensation(s) that you would feel no need to experience
> that actual but instead experience the virtual?

Yes. But it would be better to say that there is, at
that point, **no difference** between the "actual" and
the "virtual".

-Carl

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 02:37 pm, Gene Ward Smith wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Jon Szanto" <JSZANTO@A...> wrote:
> > So you are on the record saying that a description of a physical
> > sensation (or large collection thereof) could be so exacting, so
> > equivalent to the actual physical sensation(s) that you would feel no
> > need to experience that actual but instead experience the virtual?
>
> Why do you think the Orgasmatron works so well?

Woody Allen?

In all seriousness, even masturbation is not as satisfying as actual sex,
because the underlying aspect of a shared experience is missing (i.e. the
communication between lovers is the real desire)

Isn't that obvious?

Best,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 02:25 pm, Carl Lumma wrote:
> > "Another example would be closer to male experience, as
> > we referred to it.
> >
> > I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or
> > 'symbolic' representation of a thing or a subjective
> > sensation.
>
> Don't assume that. A process might also be a description.
>
> > Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse
> > exists that would be so accurate, that you would feel the
> > need to refrain from losing your virginity?
>
> In the brain (and body) of the person losing his or her
> virginity, there is no doubt such a definition.

I'm sure there is a symbolic representation ('that was great last night')
But you think that symbolic representation could be transmitted to a third
party who would then 'experience' the same subjective feelings, etc?

I highly doubt so.

> > Could such a description, whose existence is dubious,
> > be calculated by a Turing machine?
>
> I believe so.

hmmmm....

> > In other words, you have *that* little faith in the
> > specialness of the subjective 'first-person' experience
> > and existence?
>
> Yep.

double hmmm....

> > The affirmative answer would spell death for music, art
> > and poetry (as we know it, anyway) ;)"
>
> Well you know how much I like music (and you might not
> know how much you like poetry and art!), so this
> obviously isn't true in all cases.
>
> > > I missed that question, but I will so answer.
> >
> > (Jon wrote) So you are on the record saying that a description of a
> > physical sensation (or large collection thereof) could
> > be so exacting, so equivalent to the actual physical
> > sensation(s) that you would feel no need to experience
> > that actual but instead experience the virtual?
>
> Yes. But it would be better to say that there is, at
> that point, **no difference** between the "actual" and
> the "virtual".

So a book containing a symbolic representation of the sex act is *the same* as
the act itself?

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

Another thought experiment for Carl:

Is it possible for a man to experience, in the first person, being a woman?
(sex-changes don't count)

Put another way--let's say you're right, and a symbolic transmission of a
subjective experience is possible. How would we know that upon receiving it,
we hadn't 're-mapped' it in our brains to the closest approximation to it
that our particular brain would allow.

You could fill in, for that matter, trying to experience another animal's
consciousness, instead of a man experiencing a woman's.....

Such questions lead me to the conclusion that transmission of an accurate
subjective experience is forever outside of the realm of scientific
possibility.....

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > > Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse
> > > exists that would be so accurate, that you would feel the
> > > need to refrain from losing your virginity?
> >
> > In the brain (and body) of the person losing his or her
> > virginity, there is no doubt such a definition.
>
> I'm sure there is a symbolic representation ('that was great
> last night') But you think that symbolic representation
> could be transmitted to a third party who would then
> 'experience' the same subjective feelings, etc?

Not necessarily. In fact, here's where I disagree with
Kurzweil. It's been years since I've read my essay on this,
but here it is:

http://lumma.org/stuff/sciam.txt

> > > So you are on the record saying that a description of a
> > > physical sensation (or large collection thereof) could
> > > be so exacting, so equivalent to the actual physical
> > > sensation(s) that you would feel no need to experience
> > > that actual but instead experience the virtual?
> >
> > Yes. But it would be better to say that there is, at
> > that point, **no difference** between the "actual" and
> > the "virtual".
>
> So a book containing a symbolic representation of the sex
> act is *the same* as the act itself?

Did you miss where I said "process"? ...

> > > I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or
> > > 'symbolic' representation of a thing or a subjective
> > > sensation.
> >
> > Don't assume that. A process might also be a description.

-Carl

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > Another thought experiment for Carl:
> >
> > Is it possible for a man to experience, in the
> > first person, being a woman? (sex-changes don't
> > count)
>
> I wish! :)
>
> Seriously, hopefully my last post in this thread
> will make my position clear.

And maybe I'll clarify here too. It's the future,
and perfect sex-change operations are now possible
(for the sake of arguement, they can even change your
brain to be more like a female's). We might have
the following situation. As I live with the new
state, I start to have the experience of being a
woman. I won't be the same as if I had I not done
the operation.

But I'll still have the past of being a man. So I
won't be the same as if I had been a woman all along.

Then again, if I don't get the operation, I'll
change anyway, and I'll won't be the same later on
as I am right now.

This make any sense?

-Carl

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

No. A book is just paper and ink. But there might be a
machine, and I think a Turing machine will do, that when
fed the contents of the book as input would then have the
experience of intercourse as it ran.

This is essentially Deutsch's Virtual Reality principle.

-Carl

🔗Jon Szanto <JSZANTO@...>

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 03:38 pm, Carl Lumma wrote:
> > > > Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse
> > > > exists that would be so accurate, that you would feel the
> > > > need to refrain from losing your virginity?
> > >
> > > In the brain (and body) of the person losing his or her
> > > virginity, there is no doubt such a definition.
> >
> > I'm sure there is a symbolic representation ('that was great
> > last night') But you think that symbolic representation
> > could be transmitted to a third party who would then
> > 'experience' the same subjective feelings, etc?
>
> Not necessarily. In fact, here's where I disagree with
> Kurzweil. It's been years since I've read my essay on this,
> but here it is:
>
> http://lumma.org/stuff/sciam.txt

Yes, we agree 100% about this issue. Transmission of information must have an
adequate mode of analogous processing at both ends, and there is no guarantee
that the 'message' will be heard, even if the receiving end has appropriate
'hardwiring'....

> > > > So you are on the record saying that a description of a
> > > > physical sensation (or large collection thereof) could
> > > > be so exacting, so equivalent to the actual physical
> > > > sensation(s) that you would feel no need to experience
> > > > that actual but instead experience the virtual?
> > >
> > > Yes. But it would be better to say that there is, at
> > > that point, **no difference** between the "actual" and
> > > the "virtual".
> >
> > So a book containing a symbolic representation of the sex
> > act is *the same* as the act itself?
>
> Did you miss where I said "process"? ...

> > > > (Aaron) I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or
> > > > 'symbolic' representation of a thing or a subjective
> > > > sensation.
> > >
> > > (Carl) Don't assume that. A process might also be a description.

Well, if a 'process' is equivalent to the original thing, it *is* that thing.
And there would be no point in arguing.

But let's try to be more realistic. I think you *don't* mean to say that there
is an English sentence or paragraph or X length string that will suffice to
conjure up an *exact* replica of a given person's subjective experience of
something like losing their virginity. Obviously, a memoir attempts to
abstract such an experience down to a narrative which can approximate the
experience, but never can it be so precise as to actually make a reader
*experience* that exact conscious experience the writer had.

So I think you are arguing that perhaps a 'brainstorms' type machine might be
constructed, which could record a person's brainwaves, etc. and play them
back to another's, theoretically giving the user the same experience during
playback that the recorder had.

But how would it be the same? Does the playback cause the user's own nervous
system to shut down entirely? How do we know that it was exactly the same
experience, and not our local nervous system altering it on our end?

Even in principle, therfore, a 'process' like a brain recorder machine is
completely dubious.

Let's go further: a virgin user has a simulated (recording) experience of sex
on the machine, and then has real sex, and then says they compare quite
favorably, but have subtle differences. Do you think another person would be
able to not supress their curiosity about the subtle differences to *not*
want to try real sex? Do you think the original user would have any way of
knowing that the subtle differences were caused by the different medium, and
not just the fact that it was a different experience, with perhaps a
different partner? Even with the same partner, no two experiences are ever
the 'same'.

This all, of course, goes back to, 'how do I know you see the color red the
way I do'?

I think even a 'successful' machine would leave us doubting that it was at all
a real experience. One could, perhaps, just choose to have faith that it was.
I wouldn't.

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 05:13 pm, Carl Lumma wrote:
> > > > So you are on the record saying that a description of a
> > > > physical sensation (or large collection thereof) could
> > > > be so exacting, so equivalent to the actual physical
> > > > sensation(s) that you would feel no need to experience
> > > > that actual but instead experience the virtual?
> > >
> > > Yes. But it would be better to say that there is, at
> > > that point, **no difference** between the "actual" and
> > > the "virtual".
> >
> > So a book containing a symbolic representation of the sex
> > act is *the same* as the act itself?
>
> No. A book is just paper and ink. But there might be a
> machine, and I think a Turing machine will do, that when
> fed the contents of the book as input would then have the
> experience of intercourse as it ran.

But if you're contention is that we *can* be simulated by a Turing machine,
you're also saying that we could be fed that book.

So we're back to saying whethere that 'book' could exist. Does that make
sense?

Even without all of what I just said, how would we know that the Turing
machine was ever *really* experiencing intercourse, assuming you're right.
We'd have a situation where what you say waas true, but it is a completely
unverifiable truth !!!

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗David Beardsley <db@...>

Jon Szanto wrote:

>--- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Lumma" <clumma@y...> wrote:
> >
>>No. A book is just paper and ink. But there might be a
>>machine, and I think a Turing machine will do, that when
>>fed the contents of the book as input would then have the
>>experience of intercourse as it ran.
>>
>>This is essentially Deutsch's Virtual Reality principle.
>> >>
>
>Deutsch can keep his principle. All of this is like a very, very bad
>Star Trek episode (just before Captain Kirk kisses the sexy android
>who is, for no apparant reason, wearing a skin-tight, skimpy silver
>outfit).
>
>"Ain't nothing like the real thing, baby, ain't nothing like the real
>thing..."
> >
Let's not be judgemental Jon. If Monzo wants to get a sex change, let him get it.

--
* David Beardsley
* microtonal guitar
* http://biink.com/db

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 05:21 pm, Jon Szanto wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Lumma" <clumma@y...> wrote:
> > No. A book is just paper and ink. But there might be a
> > machine, and I think a Turing machine will do, that when
> > fed the contents of the book as input would then have the
> > experience of intercourse as it ran.
> >
> > This is essentially Deutsch's Virtual Reality principle.
>
> Deutsch can keep his principle. All of this is like a very, very bad
> Star Trek episode (just before Captain Kirk kisses the sexy android
> who is, for no apparant reason, wearing a skin-tight, skimpy silver
> outfit).
>
> "Ain't nothing like the real thing, baby, ain't nothing like the real
> thing..."

Jon, Carl,

I just laughed out loud so hard that my wife had to hear an explanation of
what was going on!!! She had a good laugh too, as soon as I said "very, very
bad Star Trek episode".

Thanks for that !!

BTW, Cap'n Kirk did get to lay some real hot androids, huh?

Cheers,

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 10:48 pm, Gene Ward Smith wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Lumma" <clumma@y...> wrote:
> > No, a book that makes sense to a turing machine doesn't
> > necessarily make sense to an epiphenomenon of a turing
> > machine (human).
>
> A turing machine is simply a means of defining a general recursive
> function. Are human beings an epiphenomenon of the function itself, of
> some of its values, or do they result from the process of computing
> those values? If so, how does computing some of the values of a
> function produce human beings? Could human beings be produced simply
> from a giant lookup table which told you to produce behavior a under
> conditions A?

I'm guessing 'no', I take it Carl guesses 'yes'....

Curious what you think, Gene !

I generally have become convinced that a mind of capability level X, even if
it turns out to be epiphenomenal, could not be understood by itself: it would
take a mind of greater level (I want to say X+1, but I think the problem is
so intractable that it might even be difficult, if not impossible to find
that ratio)

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > No, a book that makes sense to a turing machine doesn't
> > necessarily make sense to an epiphenomenon of a turing
> > machine (human).
>
> A turing machine is simply a means of defining a general
> recursive function.

Turing machines are a means to define the class of
recursively enumerable functions. They can also be
machines that reorganize matter and energy. You may
recognize that thing on the desk in front of you.

I know it sounds like it's slipping back to dualism.
But matter and energy are information too, according
to Fredkin. They are patterns in a CA that is
probably Turing complete.

> If so, how does computing some of the values of a
> function produce human beings?

If human beings are machines that compute a certain
function, and you have a Turing machine that computes
the same function... then you have a human being.
My sciam letter gives reasons to think it's impossible
to clone particular humans in this way...

-Carl

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > If human beings are machines that compute a certain
> > function, and you have a Turing machine that computes
> > the same function... then you have a human being.
>
> It doesn't follow from your premises, since there are
> many ways to compute the same function.

The above glosses over the question of whether we're
talking about humans in general, or instances of
humans.

That aside, I'm claiming it doesn't really matter how
you do it -- you get as close to what you want as you
got with your definition of the function.

Time is the most glaring thing -- if your
implementation takes a billion years, it isn't quite
human. But it really *couldn't* compute the same
function on that time scale because many of the things
humans do to their environment would be impossible if
you slowed them down that much.

So if you get really picky in defining this function,
what you get has to look quite Homo sapien. And indeed
a turing machine computing the function on an atomic-
scale tape might actually produce a Homo sapien.

-Carl