Yahoo Tuning Groups Ultimate Backup metatuning Enlightenment, Buddhism, mind as non-algorithmic

On Friday 09 July 2004 02:34 am, Carl Lumma wrote:
> By the way, Aaron, Robert and all -- I'd love
> to have your comments on...
>
> http://www.lumma.org/microwave/#2003.05.07
>
> and...
>
> http://www.lumma.org/microwave/#2003.05.02
>
> -Carl

OK...here goes....(I only address the 'qualia' entry, not the 'solipsism'
entry, where what you have written seems perfectly self-evident (to me).

Carl writes, in his weblog:
>The problem is figuring out just what 'qualia' are. Whatever one
>asks of a zombie it can do with flying colors, save that it still
>doesn't amount to 'qualia'. They simply lack whatever can't be
>described precisely, but that humans happen to have. But humans
>cannot have what cannot be described!

Well, I would say if a zombie had qualia, it wouldn't be a zombie. Qualia are
certainly the reason we engage in musical activity, art, cuisine,
hang-gliding, sex, taking vacations to gorgeous natural settings, etc. In
short, anything we enjoy about life is evidence that qualia exists, and I
don't understand the academic fuss about whether 'qualia' exist. Dennett and
his camp are thouroughly unconvincing on this point.

>If you can define precisely what you want explained, there's
>always an explanation, or there isn't (in a finite time). Either
>way, the definition alone contributes some useful de-mystifying
>of the thing -- when there is no useful explanation one can still
>ignore the thing, to advantage.

Perhaps whatever qualia is is 'non-algorithmic' or 'non-computable', which
would have profound implications as to what this universe is actually all
about: it would mean that consciousness is a substrate of being.

OTOH, it certainly seems to be the case that symphonies being written requires
a human mind, and that always seems to require a human being with a
body/heart/brain. BTW, I think what we call 'mind' is *more* than
brain---there is ample evidence that people undergo *personality*
transformations when they get, for example, a heart transplant.

There is definately something funny and mysterious going on about life !!

>But qualia not only can't be explained, it can't be defined.
>And undefined questions don't exist.

I'm not sure what you mean here....does this mean that questions about NASA
space probes didn't exist in 868 A.D.? That kind of thing?

I would argue that there are 'potential' questions that we can't verbalize,
just as there are mathematical facts that we can't ever know.....

>If you study the arguments of the qualia people, you see they are
>always moving the target. No matter what you offer to explain
>they will say it still in some way does not address the
>phenomenon they're thinking of. If you ask them to define it,
>they say it can't be defined, and 'that's the paradox of qualia'.

Although I'm sympathetic to your argument, I tend to agree that that
explanation of qualia is completely lacking in the hard AI camp (eg Daniel
Dennett). This is a failure of books such as 'Consciousness Explained'.

It's funny how some scientists don't accept paradox in consciousness studies,
but they seem perfectly happy with all the weird paradoxes of QM. My theory
is that mind is the substrate of reality, and the paradoxes of QM and
consciousness is simply the fact that in studying QM, in some sense, perhaps
a more real sense than we have previously imagined, we are trying to touch
and study 'ourselves'....and that to know one's self is ultimately impossible
(sort of like an eyeball trying to look at itself without a mirror)

>If you offer that undefined questions don't exist, you may get
>something like, 'But I still see red!' But it does not follow
>that the seeing of red is inexplicable.

You may be right, but I fail to be satisfied or convinced by any of the
current theories about why we have qualia, *at all*. They simply tend to
dismiss it as subjective nonsense, and that to explain consciousness, all one
needs is a functional description.

Funny, their 'functional descriptions' have failed to produce anything
remotely able to pass a Turing Test.

I propose 'Johnson's test': A given theory of consciousness and qualia is
correct when , applied to technology, it produces a sentient being capable of
passing the Turing Test.

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> OK...here goes....(I only address the 'qualia' entry, not
> the 'solipsism' entry, where what you have written seems
> perfectly self-evident (to me).

Thanks for your feedback!!

> Carl writes, in his weblog:
> >The problem is figuring out just what 'qualia' are.
> >Whatever one asks of a zombie it can do with flying
> >colors, save that it still doesn't amount to 'qualia'.
> >They simply lack whatever can't be described precisely,
> >but that humans happen to have. But humans cannot
> >have what cannot be described!
>
> Well, I would say if a zombie had qualia, it wouldn't
> be a zombie.

That's the definition of zombie, yes.

> In short, anything we enjoy about life is evidence that
> qualia exists,

And zombies do all those same things. So they must have
qualia, which is a contradiction. Hence, zombies cannot
exist. That's one way to look at it.

> >If you can define precisely what you want explained, there's
> >always an explanation, or there isn't (in a finite time).
> >Either way, the definition alone contributes some useful
> >de-mystifying of the thing -- when there is no useful
> >explanation one can still ignore the thing, to advantage.
>
> Perhaps whatever qualia is is 'non-algorithmic' or 'non-
> computable', which would have profound implications as to
> what this universe is actually all about: it would mean
> that consciousness is a substrate of being.

That would be interesting, however I'm not aware of any
reason to think anything uncomputable is happening in the
mind.

> OTOH, it certainly seems to be the case that symphonies being
> written requires a human mind,

Why? Wait, don't answer that -- this thread is waaay out of
control!

> and that always seems to require a human being with a
> body/heart/brain. BTW, I think what we call 'mind' is *more*
> than brain---

Indeed. The motor and sensory attachments are an inseperable
part of the brain, as far as the mind is concerned.

> there is ample evidence that people undergo *personality*
> transformations when they get, for example, a heart transplant.

I strongly suspect that's possible.

> There is definately something funny and mysterious going
> on about life !!

It's only mysterious until you understand it. And Mark
Tilden's work already suggests mechanisms that might
explain it.

> >But qualia not only can't be explained, it can't be defined.
> >And undefined questions don't exist.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean here....does this mean that
> questions about NASA space probes didn't exist in 868 A.D.?
> That kind of thing?

If a thing has no description, it isn't a thing at all.

"A One that is not Cold, is scarcely a One at all."

> I would argue that there are 'potential' questions that we
> can't verbalize, just as there are mathematical facts that
> we can't ever know.....

Sure, but this is different. You can define a real number
that's uncomputable, for example, but it is _defined_.

The worst you can do is randomness, but you can still say,
"that's random!".

>>If you study the arguments of the qualia people, you see
>>they are always moving the target. No matter what you
>>offer to explain they will say it still in some way does
>>not address the phenomenon they're thinking of. If you
>>ask them to define it, they say it can't be defined,
>>and 'that's the paradox of qualia'.
>
> Although I'm sympathetic to your argument, I tend to
> agree that that explanation of qualia is completely
> lacking in the hard AI camp (eg Daniel Dennett).

Gee, I never thought of Dennett as a hard-AIer!

> This is a failure of books such as 'Consciousness Explained'.

That book sucked rocks.

> It's funny how some scientists don't accept paradox in
> consciousness studies, but they seem perfectly happy with
> all the weird paradoxes of QM.

I don't know that they're happy about them, but QM does
have the benefit of making great predictions.

Also, I'm not sure I'd call them paradoxes -- the "many
histories" interpretation seems fairly sensical.

> My theory is that mind is
> the substrate of reality,

Swap "information" for "mind", and we agree.

>>If you offer that undefined questions don't exist, you
>>may get something like, 'But I still see red!' But
>>it does not follow that the seeing of red is inexplicable.
>
> You may be right, but I fail to be satisfied or convinced
> by any of the current theories about why we have qualia,
> *at all*. They simply tend to dismiss it as subjective
> nonsense, and that to explain consciousness, all one
> needs is a functional description.

It's nonsense until you define it. So, what are qualia?
Define them, and you have something you can then study.
Otherwise, you're just spouting nonsense.

> Funny, their 'functional descriptions' have failed to
> produce anything remotely able to pass a Turing Test.

Yep, the classic AI camp is waaay off base.

> I propose 'Johnson's test': A given theory of consciousness
> and qualia is correct when, applied to technology, it
> produces a sentient being capable of passing the Turing Test.

Good test.

-Carl

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Paul Erlich <PERLICH@...>

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Friday 09 July 2004 01:52 pm, Carl Lumma wrote:
> > OK...here goes....(I only address the 'qualia' entry, not
> > the 'solipsism' entry, where what you have written seems
> > perfectly self-evident (to me).
>
> Thanks for your feedback!!
>
> > Carl writes, in his weblog:
> > >The problem is figuring out just what 'qualia' are.
> > >Whatever one asks of a zombie it can do with flying
> > >colors, save that it still doesn't amount to 'qualia'.
> > >They simply lack whatever can't be described precisely,
> > >but that humans happen to have. But humans cannot
> > >have what cannot be described!
> >
> > Well, I would say if a zombie had qualia, it wouldn't
> > be a zombie.
>
> That's the definition of zombie, yes.
>
> > In short, anything we enjoy about life is evidence that
> > qualia exists,
>
> And zombies do all those same things. So they must have
> qualia, which is a contradiction. Hence, zombies cannot
> exist. That's one way to look at it.

Yes. So I would say "zombies cannot enjoy qualia" and remain zombies.
As soon as subjective pain or enjoyment, experienced by an 'I' enters the
picture, you don't have a zombie.

> > >If you can define precisely what you want explained, there's
> > >always an explanation, or there isn't (in a finite time).
> > >Either way, the definition alone contributes some useful
> > >de-mystifying of the thing -- when there is no useful
> > >explanation one can still ignore the thing, to advantage.
> >
> > Perhaps whatever qualia is is 'non-algorithmic' or 'non-
> > computable', which would have profound implications as to
> > what this universe is actually all about: it would mean
> > that consciousness is a substrate of being.
>
> That would be interesting, however I'm not aware of any
> reason to think anything uncomputable is happening in the
> mind.

I don't understand how you think that. 'Insight' is a non-algorithmic
phenomenon. A machine cannot have insight unless it has a self.

Algorithmic music will always sound like it was limited by the parameter
chosen to be algorithmically manipulated. Only the human programmer can make
the decision to add a new parameter. The system itself doesn't ever escape
it's own hard-coded rules. It takes 'insight' to transcend. And joy and
playfulness to want to do so. Listen to a Beethoven scherzo and it is so
apparant that we are dealing with a message from one human being to another.
That sense of musical communication is never to be found in any algorithm.

I will really only believe otherwise when I see that a machine possesses
insight and joy, and compose a tune that wasn't based on hard-coded
programmers rules.

> > OTOH, it certainly seems to be the case that symphonies being
> > written requires a human mind,
>
> Why? Wait, don't answer that -- this thread is waaay out of
> control!

I already answered above, anyhow.

> > and that always seems to require a human being with a
> > body/heart/brain. BTW, I think what we call 'mind' is *more*
> > than brain---
>
> Indeed. The motor and sensory attachments are an inseperable
> part of the brain, as far as the mind is concerned.
>
> > there is ample evidence that people undergo *personality*
> > transformations when they get, for example, a heart transplant.
>
> I strongly suspect that's possible.
>
> > There is definately something funny and mysterious going
> > on about life !!
>
> It's only mysterious until you understand it. And Mark
> Tilden's work already suggests mechanisms that might
> explain it.

Nonsense. Anything can be written on paper. The proof is in an organically
creative robot. And that's not about to happen in our lifetime. But again,
I'd love to be proven wrong.

> If a thing has no description, it isn't a thing at all.
>
> "A One that is not Cold, is scarcely a One at all."

This is sophistry. That's like saying saying dinosaurs weren't dinsoaurs until
we discovered their bones and said 'It's an ancient fosillized large
reptilian being'

It's also a way for scientists who think they've wrapped everything in the
universe into a GUT to smuggly sit back and put the burden of proof of their
unsolved questions on the semantics of everyday definitions. It's all smoke
and mirrors, and I've caught on to *that* game.

> > I would argue that there are 'potential' questions that we
> > can't verbalize, just as there are mathematical facts that
> > we can't ever know.....
>
> Sure, but this is different. You can define a real number
> that's uncomputable, for example, but it is _defined_.

Right, and qualia are uncomputable *and* undefinable. What is your hangup with
*definition*? Haven't you played the 'circular dictionary game'? All words
are ultimately undefined and are only definable in terms of each other!!!

> > It's funny how some scientists don't accept paradox in
> > consciousness studies, but they seem perfectly happy with
> > all the weird paradoxes of QM.
>
> I don't know that they're happy about them, but QM does
> have the benefit of making great predictions.
>
> Also, I'm not sure I'd call them paradoxes -- the "many
> histories" interpretation seems fairly sensical.

Yes, but it violates many individuals faith in Occam's razor.

> > My theory is that mind is
> > the substrate of reality,
>
> Swap "information" for "mind", and we agree.

Or, equate them!! Maybe thermostats have a basic awareness. (Another way to
take this argument)

> >>If you offer that undefined questions don't exist, you
> >>may get something like, 'But I still see red!' But
> >>it does not follow that the seeing of red is inexplicable.

Correct. But neither does it show that it *is* explicable.

> > You may be right, but I fail to be satisfied or convinced
> > by any of the current theories about why we have qualia,
> > *at all*. They simply tend to dismiss it as subjective
> > nonsense, and that to explain consciousness, all one
> > needs is a functional description.
>
> It's nonsense until you define it. So, what are qualia?
> Define them, and you have something you can then study.
> Otherwise, you're just spouting nonsense.

The smell of perfume is nonsense? The sharp pain of a hangnail is nonsense?
An orgasm is nonsense? And I'm not talking about the biological functionality
of these things, but the subjective *experience* of them.

We all feel these things *fundamentally*, because we are 'homo sapiens'.
'Mind' is fundamental, just like energy and time. The only reason one would
reject this idea is the a-priori attachment to reductionism, which we now
know is very limited in its explicative power. It has been replaced by a new
science of holism, of synergy, of complexity of relation, and of
irreducibility.

No reductionist description of consciouness could ever satisfy, because
reductionism seeks to eliminate subjectivity from the cosmos. Only a science
which accept synergy, a putting together of parts, will come close; or one
where mind is considered a fundamental property like matter and energy.

Alfred North Whitehead was a seeker of such a science--he sought the unity
behind subjective and objective. As I said before, the apparent strangeness
of the QM world is probably our selves bumping into 'our selves'.

> > Funny, their 'functional descriptions' have failed to
> > produce anything remotely able to pass a Turing Test.
>
> Yep, the classic AI camp is waaay off base.

Well, here we definately *agree* !!!!!!!!

> > I propose 'Johnson's test': A given theory of consciousness
> > and qualia is correct when, applied to technology, it
> > produces a sentient being capable of passing the Turing Test.
>
> Good test.

The only test that counts in this argument: a pragmatic one !!!!

Best,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > That would be interesting, however I'm not aware of any
> > reason to think anything uncomputable is happening in the
> > mind.
>
> I don't understand how you think that. 'Insight' is a
> non-algorithmic phenomenon.

What evidence do you have to support this view?

> A machine cannot have insight unless it has a self.

What's a self?

> Algorithmic music will always sound like it was limited
> by the parameter chosen to be algorithmically manipulated.

Algorithms can already produce dance music indistinguishable
from human-created dance music.

I know: not very impressive. :)

Thing is, there aren't many people working on this problem.
Most algo-comp is specifically meant to sound weird. EMI
is the only attempt I know of, and it's fairly successful.

Doug Hofstadter gave a talk on EMI at UI once. He's a
fairly-good pianist, by the way. He said he was blown
away by EMI's Chopin imitations. In fact he discussed
the cherry-picking issue, and played some pieces that
supposedly represented a more average output. They weren't
that bad, though none of the pieces were fooling anyone.

> Only the human programmer can make
> the decision to add a new parameter.

Unless you have a program that can edit its own code.

> The system itself doesn't ever escape
> it's own hard-coded rules.

Stop thinking inside the box! Classic AI is a straw
man. You can't draw results based on its failure.

What do you think of "artificial life"? All
entirely algorithmic, of course.

Also, are you familiar with the argument -- I'm sure
there's a cute name for it, I think it was first put
forward by Minsky or Moravec -- in which your neurons
are replaced, one at a time, by functional copies?

Individual neurons, while far from being understood,
and while being FAR more advanced than the switches
in traditional neural nets, are concievably pretty
straightforward to model in software.

> It takes 'insight' to transcend.

It takes shoewax to inflate balloons.

> I will really only believe otherwise when I see that a
> machine possesses insight and joy, and compose a tune
> that wasn't based on hard-coded programmers rules.

You might just live to see it.

> > > There is definately something funny and mysterious going
> > > on about life !!
> >
> > It's only mysterious until you understand it. And Mark
> > Tilden's work already suggests mechanisms that might
> > explain it.
>
> Nonsense. Anything can be written on paper. The proof is
> in an organically creative robot.

You might not be familiar with Mark Tilden -- he's a robot
maker.

> And that's not about to happen in our lifetime. But again,
> I'd love to be proven wrong.

Here's an argument:

http://www.lumma.org/microwave/#2002.06.16

> > If a thing has no description, it isn't a thing at all.
> >
> > "A One that is not Cold, is scarcely a One at all."
>
> This is sophistry. That's like saying saying dinosaurs
> weren't dinsoaurs until we discovered their bones and
> said 'It's an ancient fosillized large reptilian being'

That second line isn't sophistry, it's Homestarrunner!

And the first line isn't sophistry, nor is it anything
like your dinosaur analogy.

> It's also a way for scientists who think they've wrapped
> everything in the universe into a GUT to smuggly sit back
> and put the burden of proof of their unsolved questions
> on the semantics of everyday definitions. It's all smoke
> and mirrors, and I've caught on to *that* game.

I've never encountered such a scientist,
but I'll know what to do when I do.

> > > I would argue that there are 'potential' questions that we
> > > can't verbalize, just as there are mathematical facts that
> > > we can't ever know.....
> >
> > Sure, but this is different. You can define a real number
> > that's uncomputable, for example, but it is _defined_.
>
> Right, and qualia are uncomputable *and* undefinable.

Again, there's ain't anything that's undefinable.

> What is your hangup with
> *definition*? Haven't you played the 'circular
> dictionary game'? All words are ultimately
> undefined and are only definable in terms of
> each other!!!

I haven't played the game, but I think you're
assuming a narrower version of definition than I.

> > > It's funny how some scientists don't accept paradox in
> > > consciousness studies, but they seem perfectly happy with
> > > all the weird paradoxes of QM.
> >
> > I don't know that they're happy about them, but QM does
> > have the benefit of making great predictions.
> >
> > Also, I'm not sure I'd call them paradoxes -- the "many
> > histories" interpretation seems fairly sensical.
>
> Yes, but it violates many individuals faith in Occam's
> razor.

Actually the "many histories" interpretation is the simplest
I'm familiar with.

> > > My theory is that mind is
> > > the substrate of reality,
> >
> > Swap "information" for "mind", and we agree.
>
> Or, equate them!!

No, mind != information.

> Maybe thermostats have a basic awareness. (Another way to
> take this argument)

One might say they have a very basic sort of awareness,
but it seems an abuse of the term.

> > >>If you offer that undefined questions don't exist, you
> > >>may get something like, 'But I still see red!' But
> > >>it does not follow that the seeing of red is inexplicable.
>
> Correct. But neither does it show that it *is* explicable.

I'm using explaining and defining interchangeably here.

> > > You may be right, but I fail to be satisfied or convinced
> > > by any of the current theories about why we have qualia,
> > > *at all*. They simply tend to dismiss it as subjective
> > > nonsense, and that to explain consciousness, all one
> > > needs is a functional description.
> >
> > It's nonsense until you define it. So, what are qualia?
> > Define them, and you have something you can then study.
> > Otherwise, you're just spouting nonsense.
>
> The smell of perfume is nonsense? The sharp pain of a
> hangnail is nonsense? An orgasm is nonsense? And I'm not
> talking about the biological functionality of these
> things, but the subjective *experience* of them.

Ok, that's a definition. How do you like it?

> The only test that counts in this argument: a
> pragmatic one !!!!

...A statement seemingly contradicted by your comments above.

-Carl

🔗Paul Erlich <PERLICH@...>

🔗akjmicro <akjmicro@...>

--- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Lumma" <clumma@y...> wrote:
> > > That would be interesting, however I'm not aware of any
> > > reason to think anything uncomputable is happening in the
> > > mind.
> >
> > I don't understand how you think that. 'Insight' is a
> > non-algorithmic phenomenon.
>
> What evidence do you have to support this view?

Because no algorithm thus far has illustrated the 'creative spark' of
insight. So I guess I should restate this as: 'I highly doubt that
insight is algorithmic in nature'

>
> > A machine cannot have insight unless it has a self.
>
> What's a self?

If you have to ask, you'll never know. And I'm not being fatuous!

Look, we could go on endlessly, with me giving a definition from a
dictionary, and you saying 'define that', and we'll get nowhere. Some
things are axiomatic. Awareness--let's turn the tables, and perhaps
you can define it. ;)

> > Algorithmic music will always sound like it was limited
> > by the parameter chosen to be algorithmically manipulated.
>
> Algorithms can already produce dance music indistinguishable
> from human-created dance music.
>
> I know: not very impressive. :)

No, it really isn't, when you consider the order of magnitude of art
between the mechanical nature of it, and say, even the tiniest Bartok
study from 'Mikrokosmos'....

> Thing is, there aren't many people working on this problem.
> Most algo-comp is specifically meant to sound weird. EMI
> is the only attempt I know of, and it's fairly successful.

I agree. But we also should note that it is not a system that modifies
it's own code, or is in any way based on neural nets, GA, or anything
biological. That app uses Markov chains (to great effect). But I would
hardly say that it has anything humanly intelligent about it going on.

> Doug Hofstadter gave a talk on EMI at UI once. He's a
> fairly-good pianist, by the way. He said he was blown
> away by EMI's Chopin imitations. In fact he discussed
> the cherry-picking issue, and played some pieces that
> supposedly represented a more average output. They weren't
> that bad, though none of the pieces were fooling anyone.

I'm sure they didn't....

> > Only the human programmer can make
> > the decision to add a new parameter.
>
> Unless you have a program that can edit its own code.

Can you explain how this would work in practice? How would the edited
code 'know' it was making an effective aesthetic change. How would it
'transcend' itself? How would it say 'This is boring--better do that
instead'. How would it say 'This is boring in this context, but not
in this context'.

Write the code for that, if it's simply that easy !!!!!

Anyway, I don't see how self-modifying code escapes the need for
supervision by a sentient being telling it what it's goals are.
No machine to date has decided it's own goals outside of a human
programmer's goals...

I don't really for a moment think you think these problems are that
easy as your flippant answers make them seem !

> > The system itself doesn't ever escape
> > it's own hard-coded rules.
>
> Stop thinking inside the box! Classic AI is a straw
> man. You can't draw results based on its failure.

Why not? Show me a success anywhere in non-classical AI. It's all
theory at this point. All paperwork. To my knowledge, anyhow.

> What do you think of "artificial life"? All
> entirely algorithmic, of course.

I think it's promising in a primitive sort of way. Observing an amoeba
under a 'scope is still several orders of magnitude more interesting
to me, though. Do you know of any current results that would make me
think otherwise?

> Also, are you familiar with the argument -- I'm sure
> there's a cute name for it, I think it was first put
> forward by Minsky or Moravec -- in which your neurons
> are replaced, one at a time, by functional copies?

Yes, it's thought provoking...I'm not sure whether this particular
thought experiment would be at all like we think it would be if it
were capable of being done *today*.

> Individual neurons, while far from being understood,
> and while being FAR more advanced than the switches
> in traditional neural nets, are concievably pretty
> straightforward to model in software.
>
> > It takes 'insight' to transcend.
>
> It takes shoewax to inflate balloons.

It takes goatcheese to make goatcheese omelets.

> > I will really only believe otherwise when I see that a
> > machine possesses insight and joy, and compose a tune
> > that wasn't based on hard-coded programmers rules.
>
> You might just live to see it.

That would be mighty cool, and I'd jump for joy. But I'd bet
otherwise. Right now, my wife and I would put $1000 down that Ray
Kurzweil is wrong.

> > > > There is definately something funny and mysterious going
> > > > on about life !!
> > >
> > > It's only mysterious until you understand it. And Mark
> > > Tilden's work already suggests mechanisms that might
> > > explain it.
> >
> > Nonsense. Anything can be written on paper. The proof is
> > in an organically creative robot.
>
> You might not be familiar with Mark Tilden -- he's a robot
> maker.

What about him?

I don't remember this guy's name (I think it was the 1960's or 70's?)
who built little analog automatons that had a goal: recharge when the
power is low by seeking out the wall socket. It turned out that each
robot developed a different personality !!! Some were lazy, others
active, etc. in spite of the fact that each one had the same circuit
design. Explain that !!!! (my theory would be that there is some
chaotic interaction with the environment)....

> > And that's not about to happen in our lifetime. But again,
> > I'd love to be proven wrong.
>
> Here's an argument:
>
> http://www.lumma.org/microwave/#2002.06.16

Like I said, I'd jump for joy, but I have severe doubts that the mind
as we know it is at all algorithmic.

OTOH, if quantum computers start to happen, it might be possible to
have human AI.

> > > If a thing has no description, it isn't a thing at all.
> > >
> > > "A One that is not Cold, is scarcely a One at all."
> >
> > This is sophistry. That's like saying saying dinosaurs
> > weren't dinsoaurs until we discovered their bones and
> > said 'It's an ancient fosillized large reptilian being'
>
> That second line isn't sophistry, it's Homestarrunner!
>
> And the first line isn't sophistry, nor is it anything
> like your dinosaur analogy.

I still think that's nonsense.

> > It's also a way for scientists who think they've wrapped
> > everything in the universe into a GUT to smuggly sit back
> > and put the burden of proof of their unsolved questions
> > on the semantics of everyday definitions. It's all smoke
> > and mirrors, and I've caught on to *that* game.
>
> I've never encountered such a scientist,
> but I'll know what to do when I do.

Daniel Dennett is one. To him consciousness and subjectivity are 'not
real' because they cannot be defined, which seems to be your line of
reasoning.

> > > > I would argue that there are 'potential' questions that we
> > > > can't verbalize, just as there are mathematical facts that
> > > > we can't ever know.....
> > >
> > > Sure, but this is different. You can define a real number
> > > that's uncomputable, for example, but it is _defined_.
> >
> > Right, and qualia are uncomputable *and* undefinable.
>
> Again, there's ain't anything that's undefinable.

uhh.....ok. (not)

> > What is your hangup with
> > *definition*? Haven't you played the 'circular
> > dictionary game'? All words are ultimately
> > undefined and are only definable in terms of
> > each other!!!
>
> I haven't played the game, but I think you're
> assuming a narrower version of definition than I.

ok...i'll bite. what version am i using?

> > > > It's funny how some scientists don't accept paradox in
> > > > consciousness studies, but they seem perfectly happy with
> > > > all the weird paradoxes of QM.
> > >
> > > I don't know that they're happy about them, but QM does
> > > have the benefit of making great predictions.
> > >
> > > Also, I'm not sure I'd call them paradoxes -- the "many
> > > histories" interpretation seems fairly sensical.
> >
> > Yes, but it violates many individuals faith in Occam's
> > razor.
>
> Actually the "many histories" interpretation is the simplest
> I'm familiar with.

Well, you still have the problem of explaining why the universe goes
through all that trouble branching like that. Plus, its forever an
untestable hypothesis.

> > > > My theory is that mind is
> > > > the substrate of reality,
> > >
> > > Swap "information" for "mind", and we agree.
> >
> > Or, equate them!!
>
> No, mind != information.

information is a meaningless concept without mind. information for whom?

> > Maybe thermostats have a basic awareness. (Another way to
> > take this argument)
>
> One might say they have a very basic sort of awareness,
> but it seems an abuse of the term.

i suppose.

> > > >>If you offer that undefined questions don't exist, you
> > > >>may get something like, 'But I still see red!' But
> > > >>it does not follow that the seeing of red is inexplicable.
> >
> > Correct. But neither does it show that it *is* explicable.
>
> I'm using explaining and defining interchangeably here.

You don't get the point if you don't explain why the wavelength of red
light wouldn't be perceived by a sentient being as blue and
vice-versa. Or why chocolate doesn't taste like vanilla.

A successful theory of conscious awareness would have to account for
why the molecules involved in the flavor of chocolate actually produce
the particular *sensation* that is *qualitatively* chocolate.

You, my friend, need to read Thomas Nagel's fine essay "What is it
like to be a bat?". A functional description of the nervous
functioning of an animal is still an infinity of light-years away from
a subjective experience of the bat, which is forever inaccesable to
science.

> > > > You may be right, but I fail to be satisfied or convinced
> > > > by any of the current theories about why we have qualia,
> > > > *at all*. They simply tend to dismiss it as subjective
> > > > nonsense, and that to explain consciousness, all one
> > > > needs is a functional description.
> > >
> > > It's nonsense until you define it. So, what are qualia?
> > > Define them, and you have something you can then study.
> > > Otherwise, you're just spouting nonsense.
> >
> > The smell of perfume is nonsense? The sharp pain of a
> > hangnail is nonsense? An orgasm is nonsense? And I'm not
> > talking about the biological functionality of these
> > things, but the subjective *experience* of them.
>
> Ok, that's a definition. How do you like it?

Like I have said elsewhere, I have no problem regarding mind as
axiomatic (esp. more and more, seeing that science is completely
impotent with regard to subjective experience)

A description of a vintage Bordeaux is not substitute for its tasting ;)

> > The only test that counts in this argument: a
> > pragmatic one !!!!
>
> ...A statement seemingly contradicted by your comments above.

How?

-Aaron.

🔗akjmicro <akjmicro@...>

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > > I don't understand how you think that. 'Insight'
> > > is a non-algorithmic phenomenon.
> >
> > What evidence do you have to support this view?
>
> Because no algorithm thus far has illustrated the
> 'creative spark' of insight.

Given that computers are only two (human) generations
old, it seems like shakey evidence.

> > > A machine cannot have insight unless it has a self.
> >
> > What's a self?
>
> If you have to ask, you'll never know. And I'm not
> being fatuous!
>
> Look, we could go on endlessly, with me giving a
> definition from a dictionary, and you saying 'define
> that', and we'll get nowhere.

We'd get philosophy! :)

> Awareness--let's turn the tables, and perhaps
> you can define it. ;)

"Awareness" is probably made up of several subphenomena,
all having to do with self-monitoring, as Minksy puts it.
First, though, we'll need a rough notion of how the
brain might work:

Your brain models the external world on networks of
oscillators, and somehow remembers many such models
and can instantly reactivate the right one when exposed
to just a hint of the corresponding stimulus. How it
does this is anybody's guess, but:

() memory/learning is probably a gradual 'burn in' --
the longer you look at this carpet, the better a memory
you'll have of it, at least to a point

() recall might somehow take advantage of mode-locking...

In addition to straight recall, a pattern or perhaps
class of patterns can be selected and pumped with noise,
so that what comes out will be like the memory, but
different. Poof: creativity. It goes reverse-polarity
all the way out the same motor/sense organs it came in.
Actually the neurons in your hands and such are just
part of the network. Here are two remote examples of
this kind of thing:

(1) Diana Dabby maps an artwork to a strange attractor,
then changes the initial coordinates of the attractor
by a small amount (IIRC)...

http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~lizb/chaotic-dance.html

(2) Bressloff, Cowan et al suggest that drug-induced
viusal hallucinations are caused by noisy overactivity
in certain areas of the brain. They attempt to derive
the basic types of hallucinations reported by users
by injecting noise into a model of neuron connections
in the visual cortex.

Back to awareness. Part of it, as I said earlier, has
to do with things like linguistic creativity feeding
back to the sensory cortex -- the 'inner voice' that
philosophers and spiritualists tell us to quiet. But
even the qualia that seem to exist below concepts are
built of a myriad of inner reflections.

When you're observing something, it's buring in, and
this displaces other activity in that region of the
brain. Meanwhile, similar activity may be triggered
sympathetically in nearby areas. Myriad processes try
to figure out what they can do with the data.

Farther out, highly specialized neurons transform
sense data into rich representations -- edge detection
and motion detection are two examples in vision.

In short, experience isn't passive. It is a compound
of a huge number of reactions, which are based on our
past experience and our physiological design as humans.

Yes, I guess I'm a reductionist. Things always seem
myseterious until you take them apart.

But I'm a reductionist with a twist! Sometimes, even
if you take something apart, the outside behavior
remains mysterious! Emergeant behavior. Anytime you
iterate a function whose output domain is smaller than
its input domain, supplying the extra input bits from
somewhere at each iteration, the bits you didn't supply
will be random (so long as the output states have equal
probability). Networks of ants or whatever often do
this, and the extra bits are supplied conveniently by
the other ants. In short, some things will forever
defy explanation -- you take them apartbut it doesn't
help.

BUT: THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T BUILD THEM! And
taking them apart tells you how to do so. And ALL OF
IT IS COMPUTABLE.

> > Thing is, there aren't many people working on this
> > problem. Most algo-comp is specifically meant to
> > sound weird. EMI is the only attempt I know of,
> > and it's fairly successful.
>
> I agree. But we also should note that it is not a
> system that modifies it's own code, or is in any
> way based on neural nets, GA, or anything
> biological.

Yeah: just think what you could do with such a system!

> > > Only the human programmer can make
> > > the decision to add a new parameter.
> >
> > Unless you have a program that can edit its own
> > code.
>
> Can you explain how this would work in practice?
> How would the edited code 'know' it was making an
> effective aesthetic change.

You write a bit of code that's the aesthetic judge,
that monitors the results and gives feedback to the
code editor. Its own code may be self-editable too,
of course. This isn't a useless infinite regress,
either -- remember ants.

> How would it 'transcend' itself? How would it say
> 'This is boring--better do that instead'. How
> would it say 'This is boring in this context, but
> not in this context'.

You reward it when it learns, as demonstrated by
succesful manipulation of its environment.

> Write the code for that, if it's simply that
> easy !!!!!

I didn't say it was easy.

> No machine to date has decided it's own goals
> outside of a human programmer's goals...

Why aren't humans machines, again?

> > > I will really only believe otherwise when I see that a
> > > machine possesses insight and joy, and compose a tune
> > > that wasn't based on hard-coded programmers rules.
> >
> > You might just live to see it.
>
> That would be mighty cool, and I'd jump for joy. But
> I'd bet otherwise. Right now, my wife and I would
> put $1000 down that Ray Kurzweil is wrong.

Kurzweil says stuff I think is wrong too. And my bet
is even easier to swallow, because the money happens
as late as 2055!

Actually, Kurzweil has this great paper where he bets
you a trillion dollars, or something like that.

> > > > > There is definately something funny and
> > > > > mysterious going on about life !!
> > > >
> > > > It's only mysterious until you understand it.
> > > > And Mark Tilden's work already suggests
> > > > mechanisms that might explain it.
> > >
> > > Nonsense. Anything can be written on paper.
> > > The proof is in an organically creative robot.
> >
> > You might not be familiar with Mark Tilden -- he's
> > a robot maker.
>
> What about him?

It sounded like you were accusing him of being a
pencil pusher. His robots are pretty impressive.
I think you'd like them.

> I don't remember this guy's name (I think it was the
> 1960's or 70's?) who built little analog automatons
> that had a goal: recharge when the
> power is low by seeking out the wall socket.

There was a guy in the 50's who did that, I think.
One of the founders of a cybernetics. Tilden's bots
are analog-based, very simple. His basic bot is
eight transistors! Could have been built in the
50's.

> It turned out that each
> robot developed a different personality !!!
> Some were lazy, others active, etc. in spite
> of the fact that each one had the same
> circuit design. Explain that !!!! (my theory
> would be that there is some
> chaotic interaction with the environment)....

Sounds like a good theory.

> > Here's an argument:
> >
> > http://www.lumma.org/microwave/#2002.06.16
>
>
> Like I said, I'd jump for joy, but I have severe doubts
> that the mind as we know it is at all algorithmic.
>
> OTOH, if quantum computers start to happen, it might be
> possible to have human AI.

Quantum computers are algorithmic, and work on exactly
the same class of problems as conventional computers.

> > > It's also a way for scientists who think they've wrapped
> > > everything in the universe into a GUT to smuggly sit back
> > > and put the burden of proof of their unsolved questions
> > > on the semantics of everyday definitions. It's all smoke
> > > and mirrors, and I've caught on to *that* game.
> >
> > I've never encountered such a scientist,
> > but I'll know what to do when I do.
>
> Daniel Dennett is one. To him consciousness and
> subjectivity are 'not real' because they cannot be
> defined, which seems to be your line of reasoning.

I don't think I'd call Dennett a scientist, but I could be
wrong about that.

Anywho, my line of reasoning isn't: X can't be defined,
let's ignore it. It's: IF X can't be defined, you HAVE
to ignore it, in fact you'd never know about it in the
first place.

> > > What is your hangup with
> > > *definition*? Haven't you played the 'circular
> > > dictionary game'? All words are ultimately
> > > undefined and are only definable in terms of
> > > each other!!!
> >
> > I haven't played the game, but I think you're
> > assuming a narrower version of definition than I.
>
> ok...i'll bite. what version am i using?

I don't know. I just mean:

definable? = does it have a description?

> > > > > It's funny how some scientists don't accept
> > > > > paradox in consciousness studies, but they
> > > > > seem perfectly happy with all the weird
> > > > > paradoxes of QM.
> > > >
> > > > I don't know that they're happy about them, but
> > > > QM does have the benefit of making great
> > > > predictions.
> > > >
> > > > Also, I'm not sure I'd call them paradoxes -- the
> > > > "many histories" interpretation seems fairly
> > > > sensical.
> > >
> > > Yes, but it violates many individuals faith in Occam's
> > > razor.
> >
> > Actually the "many histories" interpretation is the
> > simplest I'm familiar with.
>
> Well, you still have the problem of explaining why the
> universe goes through all that trouble branching like
> that.

That's the good thing about Many Histories -- it doesn't
actually branch. They are just could-have-beens. The
act of summing over collapses the possible histories to
a single actual event. Or something like that.

> Plus, its forever an
> untestable hypothesis.

That's why it's an _interpretation_. The testable
theory is QM itself.

> > > > > My theory is that mind is
> > > > > the substrate of reality,
> > > >
> > > > Swap "information" for "mind", and we agree.
> > >
> > > Or, equate them!!
> >
> > No, mind != information.
>
> information is a meaningless concept without mind.
> information for whom?

That's a good question. I'll think about it.

> A successful theory of conscious awareness would have
> to account for why the molecules involved in the flavor
> of chocolate actually produce the particular
> *sensation* that is *qualitatively* chocolate.

Oh heavens, I don't give a rat's ass about that.
I must not be interested in a theory of consciousness.

> You, my friend, need to read Thomas Nagel's fine essay
> "What is it like to be a bat?". A functional
> description of the nervous functioning of an animal
> is still an infinity of light-years away from
> a subjective experience of the bat, which is forever
> inaccesable to science.

Don't you mean inaccessible to humans?

I'll look for the 'ssay.

> A description of a vintage Bordeaux is not substitute
> for its tasting ;)

The right description is equivalent to the tasting.

-Carl

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Saturday 10 July 2004 02:31 am, Carl Lumma wrote:
> > > > I don't understand how you think that. 'Insight'
> > > > is a non-algorithmic phenomenon.
> > >
> > > What evidence do you have to support this view?
> >
> > Because no algorithm thus far has illustrated the
> > 'creative spark' of insight.
>
> Given that computers are only two (human) generations
> old, it seems like shakey evidence.

I'll grant you that. However, given that non-computable mathematics exists
(Hilbert's tenth problem, etc.) I propose that mind is a non-computable
phenomenon.

> > > > A machine cannot have insight unless it has a self.
> > >
> > > What's a self?
> >
> > If you have to ask, you'll never know. And I'm not
> > being fatuous!
> >
> > Look, we could go on endlessly, with me giving a
> > definition from a dictionary, and you saying 'define
> > that', and we'll get nowhere.
>
> We'd get philosophy! :)

We'd get masturbation !

> > Awareness--let's turn the tables, and perhaps
> > you can define it. ;)
>
> "Awareness" is probably made up of several subphenomena,
> all having to do with self-monitoring, as Minksy puts it.
> First, though, we'll need a rough notion of how the
> brain might work:
>
> Your brain models the external world on networks of
> oscillators, and somehow remembers many such models
> and can instantly reactivate the right one when exposed
> to just a hint of the corresponding stimulus. How it
> does this is anybody's guess, but:
>
> () memory/learning is probably a gradual 'burn in' --
> the longer you look at this carpet, the better a memory
> you'll have of it, at least to a point
>
> () recall might somehow take advantage of mode-locking...
>
> In addition to straight recall, a pattern or perhaps
> class of patterns can be selected and pumped with noise,
> so that what comes out will be like the memory, but
> different. Poof: creativity. It goes reverse-polarity
> all the way out the same motor/sense organs it came in.
> Actually the neurons in your hands and such are just
> part of the network. Here are two remote examples of
> this kind of thing:
>
> (1) Diana Dabby maps an artwork to a strange attractor,
> then changes the initial coordinates of the attractor
> by a small amount (IIRC)...

That's Diana Dabby being creative, not the computer....

> http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~lizb/chaotic-dance.html
>
> (2) Bressloff, Cowan et al suggest that drug-induced
> viusal hallucinations are caused by noisy overactivity
> in certain areas of the brain. They attempt to derive
> the basic types of hallucinations reported by users
> by injecting noise into a model of neuron connections
> in the visual cortex.

Cool. I don't deny that the brain has a causal connection to the subjective
results of mind, that much is clear. I deny that the appropriate network
topology of neurons is sufficient for subjectivity.

> Back to awareness. Part of it, as I said earlier, has
> to do with things like linguistic creativity feeding
> back to the sensory cortex -- the 'inner voice' that
> philosophers and spiritualists tell us to quiet. But
> even the qualia that seem to exist below concepts are
> built of a myriad of inner reflections.

Yes.

> When you're observing something, it's buring in, and
> this displaces other activity in that region of the
> brain. Meanwhile, similar activity may be triggered
> sympathetically in nearby areas. Myriad processes try
> to figure out what they can do with the data.
>
> Farther out, highly specialized neurons transform
> sense data into rich representations -- edge detection
> and motion detection are two examples in vision.

Representations for what/whom? What needs a 'representation'?

> In short, experience isn't passive. It is a compound
> of a huge number of reactions, which are based on our
> past experience and our physiological design as humans.

Certainly true.

> Yes, I guess I'm a reductionist. Things always seem
> myseterious until you take them apart.
>
> But I'm a reductionist with a twist! Sometimes, even
> if you take something apart, the outside behavior
> remains mysterious! Emergeant behavior. Anytime you
> iterate a function whose output domain is smaller than
> its input domain, supplying the extra input bits from
> somewhere at each iteration, the bits you didn't supply
> will be random (so long as the output states have equal
> probability). Networks of ants or whatever often do
> this, and the extra bits are supplied conveniently by
> the other ants. In short, some things will forever
> defy explanation -- you take them apartbut it doesn't
> help.
>
> BUT: THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T BUILD THEM! And
> taking them apart tells you how to do so. And ALL OF
> IT IS COMPUTABLE.

The existence of non-computable mathematics puts this optimism in doubt for
me.

I rather like the fact that the universe is throwing a monkey wrench in the
assumptions of naive and proud computer scientists (OK, I admit, I have an
emotional attachment to the idea of mind as fundamental)

I'll believe you when a computer has an emotional attachment to something that
it wasn't specifically programmed to have.

> > > Thing is, there aren't many people working on this
> > > problem. Most algo-comp is specifically meant to
> > > sound weird. EMI is the only attempt I know of,
> > > and it's fairly successful.
> >
> > I agree. But we also should note that it is not a
> > system that modifies it's own code, or is in any
> > way based on neural nets, GA, or anything
> > biological.
>
> Yeah: just think what you could do with such a system!

My guess is that it might have a suface effectiveness, but when you look
deeper, it would be trapped into the parameters that the original algorithm
was programmed to consider (by the programmer), and not have the qualities of
saying ('nope, we're trapped in a mechanical style') that the human
programmer would potentially have.

I say poentially, because I concede that humans can be quite mechanical (as
pointed out by Hofstader in Metamagical Themas)

> > > > Only the human programmer can make
> > > > the decision to add a new parameter.
> > >
> > > Unless you have a program that can edit its own
> > > code.
> >
> > Can you explain how this would work in practice?
> > How would the edited code 'know' it was making an
> > effective aesthetic change.
>
> You write a bit of code that's the aesthetic judge,
> that monitors the results and gives feedback to the
> code editor. Its own code may be self-editable too,
> of course. This isn't a useless infinite regress,
> either -- remember ants.

The key word being 'you' (the human programmer). I would want the machine to
decide that this was neccessary *by itself*, as a result of the emergent
behavior you claim is key to consciousness.

> > How would it 'transcend' itself? How would it say
> > 'This is boring--better do that instead'. How
> > would it say 'This is boring in this context, but
> > not in this context'.
>
> You reward it when it learns, as demonstrated by
> succesful manipulation of its environment.
>
> > Write the code for that, if it's simply that
> > easy !!!!!
>
> I didn't say it was easy.

Perhaps because it's impossible?

> > No machine to date has decided it's own goals
> > outside of a human programmer's goals...
>
> Why aren't humans machines, again?
>
> > > > I will really only believe otherwise when I see that a
> > > > machine possesses insight and joy, and compose a tune
> > > > that wasn't based on hard-coded programmers rules.
> > >
> > > You might just live to see it.
> >
> > That would be mighty cool, and I'd jump for joy. But
> > I'd bet otherwise. Right now, my wife and I would
> > put $1000 down that Ray Kurzweil is wrong.
>
> Kurzweil says stuff I think is wrong too. And my bet
> is even easier to swallow, because the money happens
> as late as 2055!
>
> Actually, Kurzweil has this great paper where he bets
> you a trillion dollars, or something like that.

That's ballsy....

> > > > > > There is definately something funny and
> > > > > > mysterious going on about life !!
> > > > >
> > > > > It's only mysterious until you understand it.
> > > > > And Mark Tilden's work already suggests
> > > > > mechanisms that might explain it.
> > > >
> > > > Nonsense. Anything can be written on paper.
> > > > The proof is in an organically creative robot.
> > >
> > > You might not be familiar with Mark Tilden -- he's
> > > a robot maker.
> >
> > What about him?
>
> It sounded like you were accusing him of being a
> pencil pusher. His robots are pretty impressive.
> I think you'd like them.

I think I've seen his work. Pretty cool.

> > I don't remember this guy's name (I think it was the
> > 1960's or 70's?) who built little analog automatons
> > that had a goal: recharge when the
> > power is low by seeking out the wall socket.
>
> There was a guy in the 50's who did that, I think.
> One of the founders of a cybernetics. Tilden's bots
> are analog-based, very simple. His basic bot is
> eight transistors! Could have been built in the
> 50's.

Do you know who that 50's guy was?

> Quantum computers are algorithmic, and work on exactly
> the same class of problems as conventional computers.

That's not what I've read---I've read that they potentially open up a class of
non-computable problems. I could be misremembering.

> > information is a meaningless concept without mind.
> > information for whom?
>
> That's a good question. I'll think about it.

It's a crucial question....

> > A successful theory of conscious awareness would have
> > to account for why the molecules involved in the flavor
> > of chocolate actually produce the particular
> > *sensation* that is *qualitatively* chocolate.
>
> Oh heavens, I don't give a rat's ass about that.
> I must not be interested in a theory of consciousness.

Obviously not !!!! ;)

> > You, my friend, need to read Thomas Nagel's fine essay
> > "What is it like to be a bat?". A functional
> > description of the nervous functioning of an animal
> > is still an infinity of light-years away from
> > a subjective experience of the bat, which is forever
> > inaccesable to science.
>
> Don't you mean inaccessible to humans?
>
> I'll look for the 'ssay.

It's great, and will get you thinking.

> > A description of a vintage Bordeaux is not substitute
> > for its tasting ;)
>
> The right description is equivalent to the tasting.

The description that is equivalent to the tasting is

a) non-computable
b) impossible
c) therefore doesn't exist

Best,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

> > (1) Diana Dabby maps an artwork to a strange attractor,
> > then changes the initial coordinates of the attractor
> > by a small amount (IIRC)...
>
> That's Diana Dabby being creative, not the computer....

I think her technique demonstrates what might be going
on in creativity.

> > http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~lizb/chaotic-dance.html
> >
> > (2) Bressloff, Cowan et al suggest that drug-induced
> > viusal hallucinations are caused by noisy overactivity
> > in certain areas of the brain. They attempt to derive
> > the basic types of hallucinations reported by users
> > by injecting noise into a model of neuron connections
> > in the visual cortex.
>
> Cool. I don't deny that the brain has a causal connection
> to the subjective results of mind, that much is clear.
> I deny that the appropriate network topology of neurons
> is sufficient for subjectivity.

Oh, so you're a mystic. There's no use arguing then.
But I find it hard to believe your apparent acceptence of
the Turing test, then.

> > Farther out, highly specialized neurons transform
> > sense data into rich representations -- edge detection
> > and motion detection are two examples in vision.
>
> Representations for what/whom? What needs a
> 'representation'?

Other processes.

> > Yes, I guess I'm a reductionist. Things always seem
> > myseterious until you take them apart.
> >
> > But I'm a reductionist with a twist! Sometimes, even
> > if you take something apart, the outside behavior
> > remains mysterious! Emergeant behavior. Anytime you
> > iterate a function whose output domain is smaller than
> > its input domain, supplying the extra input bits from
> > somewhere at each iteration, the bits you didn't supply
> > will be random (so long as the output states have equal
> > probability). Networks of ants or whatever often do
> > this, and the extra bits are supplied conveniently by
> > the other ants. In short, some things will forever
> > defy explanation -- you take them apartbut it doesn't
> > help.
> >
> > BUT: THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T BUILD THEM! And
> > taking them apart tells you how to do so. And ALL OF
> > IT IS COMPUTABLE.
>
> The existence of non-computable mathematics puts this
> optimism in doubt for me.

It is possible, I'll grant you, that Turing universality
is wrong.

> I rather like the fact that the universe is throwing a
> monkey wrench in the assumptions of naive and proud
> computer scientists (OK, I admit, I have an emotional
> attachment to the idea of mind as fundamental)

Yes, just as fear of death and the unknown is a better
explanation of the World's religions than the existence
of dieties... I'd say much the same thing is going on
with people's stubborn elevation of man in post-
enlightenment culture.

> I'll believe you when a computer has an emotional
> attachment to something that it wasn't specifically
> programmed to have.

Have you ever played the game Creatures? I haven't,
but based on its description in Steve Grand's book
_Creation_, it might satisfy you here.

By the way, I consider this book the best single
book ever written on the topic of AI!!

> I say poentially, because I concede that humans can be
> quite mechanical (as pointed out by Hofstader in
> Metamagical Themas)

Speaking of Hofstadter, his Metacat is a neat example
of self-modifying code. IIRC the paper on it is
included in Metamagical Themas.

> > You write a bit of code that's the aesthetic judge,
> > that monitors the results and gives feedback to the
> > code editor. Its own code may be self-editable too,
> > of course. This isn't a useless infinite regress,
> > either -- remember ants.
>
> The key word being 'you' (the human programmer). I
> would want the machine to decide that this was
> neccessary *by itself*, as a result of the emergent
> behavior you claim is key to consciousness.

But humans are born with innate and very elaborate
goal-seeking systems hard-wired in*. We don't choose
to want sex, avoid pain, hunger for food, etc. etc.

To the extent you can't predict the behavior of your
creation, I'd say you've succeeded in creating
something independent of your design.

* There's a caveat here. Most of this stuff probably
isn't formed by birth -- it finishes later, in response
to the environment. And you won't find the instructions
in the DNA -- at least you won't be able to recognize
them. There aren't enough bits in DNA to describe a
human, even at birth. That means information is being
created, probably through Wolfram's "intrinsic randomness
generation". Nevertheless, there are many innate
drives -- such as being attracted to girls' asses --
which are shared by a majority of the male population
and which I don't think can be explained culturally,
though they can probably be prevented from forming or
covered up with the right environment. In this sense
only is the term "hard wired" is appropriate.

> > You reward it when it learns, as demonstrated by
> > succesful manipulation of its environment.
> >
> > > Write the code for that, if it's simply that
> > > easy !!!!!
> >
> > I didn't say it was easy.
>
> Perhaps because it's impossible?

I don't think so.

> > Actually, Kurzweil has this great paper where he bets
> > you a trillion dollars, or something like that.
>
> That's ballsy....

You gotta read it, it's a hoot. Check out kurzweilai.net.

> > > I don't remember this guy's name (I think it was the
> > > 1960's or 70's?) who built little analog automatons
> > > that had a goal: recharge when the
> > > power is low by seeking out the wall socket.
> >
> > There was a guy in the 50's who did that, I think.
> > One of the founders of a cybernetics. Tilden's bots
> > are analog-based, very simple. His basic bot is
> > eight transistors! Could have been built in the
> > 50's.
>
> Do you know who that 50's guy was?

I think I was thinking of Gordon Pask.

Here's a nice listing of cyberneticists...

http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CSTHINK.html

This came up...

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=10126&ttype=6

$10!? You gotta be kidding me.

But, damnit, I may have been confusing Pask with someone else.
I remember seeing a photo of little robots hiding in this
guy's closet. Black & White, I think, and I think the robots
were based on vacuum tubes.....

> > Quantum computers are algorithmic, and work on exactly
> > the same class of problems as conventional computers.
>
> That's not what I've read---I've read that they potentially
> open up a class of non-computable problems. I could be
> misremembering.

It's not true, in any case. They make EXPTIME problems
practical, is all.

> > > information is a meaningless concept without mind.
> > > information for whom?
> >
> > That's a good question. I'll think about it.
>
> It's a crucial question....

Information is definitely relative to the observer, even
in Shannon, as we discussed in the car. Feynman's example
was, if I wanted to transmit Hamlet to you and I knew you
already had it on your shelf, I could just say, go over
to your shelf and read Hamlet.

However, this doesn't mean that mind = information,
which was how I read your original statement, which seems
to have been deleted in the quoting-and-replying.

> > > You, my friend, need to read Thomas Nagel's fine essay
> > > "What is it like to be a bat?". A functional
> > > description of the nervous functioning of an animal
> > > is still an infinity of light-years away from
> > > a subjective experience of the bat, which is forever
> > > inaccesable to science.
> >
> > Don't you mean inaccessible to humans?
> >
> > I'll look for the 'ssay.
>
> It's great, and will get you thinking.

It's here in my browser. If I can just get away from this
damn list!

> > > A description of a vintage Bordeaux is not substitute
> > > for its tasting ;)
> >
> > The right description is equivalent to the tasting.
>
> The description that is equivalent to the tasting is
>
> a) non-computable
> b) impossible
> c) therefore doesn't exist

Don't follow you here. I thought one of your proposals
was that non-computable things might be possible, for
example in the brain. Non-computable just means not
computable by a Turing machine. As far as we know there's
nothing that fits that bill, but. . .

-Carl

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Saturday 10 July 2004 12:49 pm, Carl Lumma wrote:

> > > (2) Bressloff, Cowan et al suggest that drug-induced
> > > viusal hallucinations are caused by noisy overactivity
> > > in certain areas of the brain. They attempt to derive
> > > the basic types of hallucinations reported by users
> > > by injecting noise into a model of neuron connections
> > > in the visual cortex.
> >
> > Cool. I don't deny that the brain has a causal connection
> > to the subjective results of mind, that much is clear.
> > I deny that the appropriate network topology of neurons
> > is sufficient for subjectivity.
>
> Oh, so you're a mystic. There's no use arguing then.
> But I find it hard to believe your apparent acceptence of
> the Turing test, then.

The Turing Test is adequate. I just doubt the techniques you propose will lead
to a positive test !!

> > > Farther out, highly specialized neurons transform
> > > sense data into rich representations -- edge detection
> > > and motion detection are two examples in vision.
> >
> > Representations for what/whom? What needs a
> > 'representation'?
>
> Other processes.

Which do what?

> > > Yes, I guess I'm a reductionist. Things always seem
> > > myseterious until you take them apart.
> > >
> > > But I'm a reductionist with a twist! Sometimes, even
> > > if you take something apart, the outside behavior
> > > remains mysterious! Emergeant behavior. Anytime you
> > > iterate a function whose output domain is smaller than
> > > its input domain, supplying the extra input bits from
> > > somewhere at each iteration, the bits you didn't supply
> > > will be random (so long as the output states have equal
> > > probability). Networks of ants or whatever often do
> > > this, and the extra bits are supplied conveniently by
> > > the other ants. In short, some things will forever
> > > defy explanation -- you take them apartbut it doesn't
> > > help.
> > >
> > > BUT: THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T BUILD THEM! And
> > > taking them apart tells you how to do so. And ALL OF
> > > IT IS COMPUTABLE.
> >
> > The existence of non-computable mathematics puts this
> > optimism in doubt for me.
>
> It is possible, I'll grant you, that Turing universality
> is wrong.

Yeah man, cool !!!!

> > I rather like the fact that the universe is throwing a
> > monkey wrench in the assumptions of naive and proud
> > computer scientists (OK, I admit, I have an emotional
> > attachment to the idea of mind as fundamental)
>
> Yes, just as fear of death and the unknown is a better
> explanation of the World's religions than the existence
> of dieties... I'd say much the same thing is going on
> with people's stubborn elevation of man in post-
> enlightenment culture.

Man is both an elightened elevated being, and a trapped animal. That's the
paradox.

> > I'll believe you when a computer has an emotional
> > attachment to something that it wasn't specifically
> > programmed to have.
>
> Have you ever played the game Creatures? I haven't,
> but based on its description in Steve Grand's book
> _Creation_, it might satisfy you here.
>
> By the way, I consider this book the best single
> book ever written on the topic of AI!!

Sounds interesting...

> > I say poentially, because I concede that humans can be
> > quite mechanical (as pointed out by Hofstader in
> > Metamagical Themas)
>
> Speaking of Hofstadter, his Metacat is a neat example
> of self-modifying code. IIRC the paper on it is
> included in Metamagical Themas.
>
> > > You write a bit of code that's the aesthetic judge,
> > > that monitors the results and gives feedback to the
> > > code editor. Its own code may be self-editable too,
> > > of course. This isn't a useless infinite regress,
> > > either -- remember ants.
> >
> > The key word being 'you' (the human programmer). I
> > would want the machine to decide that this was
> > neccessary *by itself*, as a result of the emergent
> > behavior you claim is key to consciousness.
>
> But humans are born with innate and very elaborate
> goal-seeking systems hard-wired in*. We don't choose
> to want sex, avoid pain, hunger for food, etc. etc.
>
> To the extent you can't predict the behavior of your
> creation, I'd say you've succeeded in creating
> something independent of your design.

True enough.

> * There's a caveat here. Most of this stuff probably
> isn't formed by birth -- it finishes later, in response
> to the environment. And you won't find the instructions
> in the DNA -- at least you won't be able to recognize
> them. There aren't enough bits in DNA to describe a
> human, even at birth. That means information is being
> created, probably through Wolfram's "intrinsic randomness
> generation". Nevertheless, there are many innate
> drives -- such as being attracted to girls' asses --

a drive I understand all to much.

> which are shared by a majority of the male population
> and which I don't think can be explained culturally,
> though they can probably be prevented from forming or
> covered up with the right environment.

Now I really don't think you are in touch with reality. It would only get
repressed into anxiety or agreession. I'm sure of this...

> In this sense
> only is the term "hard wired" is appropriate.
>
> > > You reward it when it learns, as demonstrated by
> > > succesful manipulation of its environment.
> > >
> > > > Write the code for that, if it's simply that
> > > > easy !!!!!
> > >
> > > I didn't say it was easy.
> >
> > Perhaps because it's impossible?
>
> I don't think so.

I do....but this is just you and I on cyber-paper. The experiments still need
to be done, granted.

> > > Actually, Kurzweil has this great paper where he bets
> > > you a trillion dollars, or something like that.
> >
> > That's ballsy....
>
> You gotta read it, it's a hoot. Check out kurzweilai.net.
>
> > > > I don't remember this guy's name (I think it was the
> > > > 1960's or 70's?) who built little analog automatons
> > > > that had a goal: recharge when the
> > > > power is low by seeking out the wall socket.
> > >
> > > There was a guy in the 50's who did that, I think.
> > > One of the founders of a cybernetics. Tilden's bots
> > > are analog-based, very simple. His basic bot is
> > > eight transistors! Could have been built in the
> > > 50's.
> >
> > Do you know who that 50's guy was?
>
> I think I was thinking of Gordon Pask.
>
> Here's a nice listing of cyberneticists...
>
> http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CSTHINK.html
>
> This came up...
>
> http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=10126&ttype=6
>
> $10!? You gotta be kidding me.
>
> But, damnit, I may have been confusing Pask with someone else.
> I remember seeing a photo of little robots hiding in this
> guy's closet. Black & White, I think, and I think the robots
> were based on vacuum tubes.....
>
> > > Quantum computers are algorithmic, and work on exactly
> > > the same class of problems as conventional computers.
> >
> > That's not what I've read---I've read that they potentially
> > open up a class of non-computable problems. I could be
> > misremembering.
>
> It's not true, in any case. They make EXPTIME problems
> practical, is all.
>
> > > > information is a meaningless concept without mind.
> > > > information for whom?
> > >
> > > That's a good question. I'll think about it.
> >
> > It's a crucial question....
>
> Information is definitely relative to the observer, even
> in Shannon, as we discussed in the car. Feynman's example
> was, if I wanted to transmit Hamlet to you and I knew you
> already had it on your shelf, I could just say, go over
> to your shelf and read Hamlet.
>
> However, this doesn't mean that mind = information,
> which was how I read your original statement, which seems
> to have been deleted in the quoting-and-replying.

Well, maybe I should say that mind is more fundamental thatn information,
since we agree that information is relative (i.e. dependant) on an observer.

This should make you question your original thesis that ''information is
fundamental" or whatever it was.

> > > > You, my friend, need to read Thomas Nagel's fine essay
> > > > "What is it like to be a bat?". A functional
> > > > description of the nervous functioning of an animal
> > > > is still an infinity of light-years away from
> > > > a subjective experience of the bat, which is forever
> > > > inaccesable to science.
> > >
> > > Don't you mean inaccessible to humans?
> > >
> > > I'll look for the 'ssay.
> >
> > It's great, and will get you thinking.
>
> It's here in my browser. If I can just get away from this
> damn list!
>
> > > > A description of a vintage Bordeaux is not substitute
> > > > for its tasting ;)
> > >
> > > The right description is equivalent to the tasting.
> >
> > The description that is equivalent to the tasting is
> >
> > a) non-computable
> > b) impossible
> > c) therefore doesn't exist
>
> Don't follow you here. I thought one of your proposals
> was that non-computable things might be possible, for
> example in the brain. Non-computable just means not
> computable by a Turing machine. As far as we know there's
> nothing that fits that bill, but. . .

My (unproven) conjecture is that at least human consciousness is one among
many potential phenomenon that fits that bill.

Actually scratch that--there is definately a host of problems we no to be
non-computable by a Turing machine: for instance the Halting Problem. The
commonplace related example is that no computer knows exactly how long it
will take to perform a given task, so the precise amount of time to flash an
hourglass or watch icon on the desktop when computing some task can never be
calculated !!!!

Another example would be closer to male experience, as we referred to it.

I'll assume you mean 'description' to be a 'textual' or 'symbolic'
representation of a thing or a subjective sensation.

Do you really think that a definition of sexual intercourse exists that would
be so accurate, that you would feel the need to refrain from losing your
virginity? Could such a description, whose existence is dubious, be
calculated by a Turing machine? In other words, you have *that* little faith
in the specialness of the subjective 'first-person' experience and existence?

The affirmative answer would spell death for music, art and poetry (as we know
it, anyway) ;)

Best,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Paul Erlich <PERLICH@...>

--- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "akjmicro" <akjmicro@c...> wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Paul Erlich" <PERLICH@A...>
wrote:
> > --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Aaron K. Johnson"
<akjmicro@c...>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > It's also a way for scientists who think they've wrapped
everything
> > in the
> > > universe into a GUT to smuggly sit back and put the burden of
proof
> > of their
> > > unsolved questions on the semantics of everyday definitions.
It's
> > all smoke
> > > and mirrors, and I've caught on to *that* game.
> >
> > Which scientists are these? I don't know of any.
>
> Like I said, Dennett.

He's a scientist? What scientific discoveries has he made? What
science journals has he published in? What's this GUT of his that you
speak of?

> Like I said, 'Wu' peed on my rug.

Is this a koan or something?

> > > We all feel these things *fundamentally*, because we are 'homo
> > sapiens'.
> > > 'Mind' is fundamental, just like energy and time. The only
reason
> > one would
> > > reject this idea is the a-priori attachment to reductionism,
which
> > we now
> > > know is very limited in its explicative power. It has been
replaced
> > by a new
> > > science of holism, of synergy, of complexity of relation, and
of
> > > irreducibility.
> >
> > A new science, ay? Is this the GUT you refer to above? Actually,
it
> > sounds more like some new-agey popularization of science to me.
>
> OK. Apart from name calling, what is your substantive argument
>against it?

Against what? Point me to this new science you're talking about,
which you say has replaced what came before.

> Ilya Prigogine subscribes to such a view.

I remember one fairly speculative article. Anything you want to refer
me to?

> As did Alfred North
> Whithead.

How new is this?

> The majority view isn't correct by default, you know.

You're really confusing me, because if a new science has come along
and replaced the old science, that sure sounds like a majority of
scientists must be on the new boat. Meanwhile, you're preaching to
the choir about majority views -- I have no trust or allegiance to
majority views on anything, particularly anything scientific. I make
up my mind for myself.

> > > No reductionist description of consciouness could ever satisfy,
> > because
> > > reductionism seeks to eliminate subjectivity from the cosmos.
> >
> > Does "Many Minds" eliminate subjectivity from the cosmos?
>
> What is Many Minds? I'm not familiar with this reference.

I have a couple of books for you:

Quantum Non-locality and Relativity: Metaphysical Intimations of
Modern Physics (Aristotelian Society Monographs)
Tim Maudlin

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0631232214/wwwlink-software-
21/026-6706670-4284424

Quantum Mechanics and Experience
David Z. Albert

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674741137/wwwlink-software-
21/026-6706670-4284424

🔗Paul Erlich <PERLICH@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Paul Erlich <PERLICH@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Gene Ward Smith <gwsmith@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 12:06 am, Paul Erlich wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Aaron K. Johnson" <akjmicro@c...>
>
> wrote:
> > I'll grant you that. However, given that non-computable mathematics
>
> exists
>
> > (Hilbert's tenth problem, etc.) I propose that mind is a non-
>
> computable
>
> > phenomenon.
>
> I think there might be a bit of sloppy reasoning here. This is like
> saying that non-real animals, such as unicorns, exist, therefore mind
> is a non-real phenomenon. Maybe I'm just misunderstanding something --
> can you clarify?

No, my reasoning is not sloppy. I'm simply proposing that the phenomenon that
allows human reasoning to be so able to 'think outside the box', and the
phenomenon that makes Hilbert's tenth problem, or the Turing's Halting
Problem, not able to yield to a general algorithmic procedure *may* be of the
same nature -- non-algorithmic.

I'm simply stating a conjecture, and betting on it's truth. Of course I have
no proof, but I have a strong gut instinct that all the pencil pushiing about
how computers will think by 2055 is mere wishful thinking. I of course *do*
have *some* evidence: how terribly lame the results in practice have been,
and how ridiculously bloated the claims of some AI people have been.

The most impressive things in AI that I have seen are the bottom-up
'insect-like things' (Mark Tilden, as Carl ppints out). But it's a long way
from there to a Beethoven symphony.

Expert Systems, we can agree, may be useful, but suck ass as definitions of
systems that will someday 'think outside the box' !!!!

> > > > information is a meaningless concept without mind.
> > > > information for whom?
> > >
> > > That's a good question. I'll think about it.
> >
> > It's a crucial question....
>
> Are you familiar with Information Theory? How about Quantum
> Information Theory? All of reality is described with information as
> the fundamental substrate. I just posted a bunch of links for Carl on
> that.

Like I've challenged Carl, I think you miss the point when defining
'information' as fundamental.

The concept of 'information' implicitely contains a sender and a receiver. The
sender must have a mind to compress the information to a level that the
receiver could potentially understand. (think Carl's Hamlet example)

So, 'information' is dependent on 'mind' and 'consciousness'. Being dependent
on them makes mind more fundamental a concept of universe than information.

Of course this makes a reductionist materialist scream bloody murder, but if
you want to make information your new all important 'zeitgeist concept', then
you pay the price of opening the door to a concept that Buddhhists are
already quite confortable with, and have formulated for thousands of years:
mind is primary.

Best,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Saturday 10 July 2004 11:35 pm, Paul Erlich wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "akjmicro" <akjmicro@c...> wrote:
> > --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Paul Erlich" <PERLICH@A...>
>
> wrote:
> > > --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Aaron K. Johnson"
>
> <akjmicro@c...>
>
> > > wrote:
> > > > It's also a way for scientists who think they've wrapped
>
> everything
>
> > > in the
> > >
> > > > universe into a GUT to smuggly sit back and put the burden of
>
> proof
>
> > > of their
> > >
> > > > unsolved questions on the semantics of everyday definitions.
>
> It's
>
> > > all smoke
> > >
> > > > and mirrors, and I've caught on to *that* game.
> > >
> > > Which scientists are these? I don't know of any.
> >
> > Like I said, Dennett.
>
> He's a scientist? What scientific discoveries has he made? What
> science journals has he published in? What's this GUT of his that you
> speak of?

I address this in another thread.

About GUT's in general, I can say they are the ultimate in hubris. Chomsky
says its like a rat being trained to make a left in a maze every prime
numbered turn. You could never train a rat to understand this.

Similarly, our hunter-gatherer brain being used for side-effects like math and
science saying to itself 'I know *all*' is an obvious crock-o-shit !!!!

So, all the physics guys who say we are on the verge of a GUT, where we know
all, I raspberry them.....

> > Like I said, 'Wu' peed on my rug.
>
> Is this a koan or something?

Haha!!!! It's a quote from the 'Big Lebowski'. The best movie of all time. Ask
Carl and he might agree. Not a Coen Bros. fan?

> > > > We all feel these things *fundamentally*, because we are 'homo
> > >
> > > sapiens'.
> > >
> > > > 'Mind' is fundamental, just like energy and time. The only
>
> reason
>
> > > one would
> > >
> > > > reject this idea is the a-priori attachment to reductionism,
>
> which
>
> > > we now
> > >
> > > > know is very limited in its explicative power. It has been
>
> replaced
>
> > > by a new
> > >
> > > > science of holism, of synergy, of complexity of relation, and
>
> of
>
> > > > irreducibility.
> > >
> > > A new science, ay? Is this the GUT you refer to above? Actually,
>
> it
>
> > > sounds more like some new-agey popularization of science to me.
> >
> > OK. Apart from name calling, what is your substantive argument
> >against it?
>
> Against what? Point me to this new science you're talking about,
> which you say has replaced what came before.

Ok, you got me here. 'Replaced' was much to strong a word. I should have said
'the old has become subsumed and absorbed into the new, which augments it.'

I speak of the work of people like Per Bak, Benoit Mandelbrot, Greogory
Chaitin, Ilya Prigogine, etc.

> > Ilya Prigogine subscribes to such a view.
>
> I remember one fairly speculative article. Anything you want to refer
> me to?

http://tinyurl.com/yuj2b

> > As did Alfred North
> > Whithead.
>
> How new is this?

....nothing new under the sun. But we change our focus from time to time, and
rediscover ways of thinking.

> > The majority view isn't correct by default, you know.
>
> You're really confusing me, because if a new science has come along
> and replaced the old science, that sure sounds like a majority of
> scientists must be on the new boat. Meanwhile, you're preaching to
> the choir about majority views -- I have no trust or allegiance to
> majority views on anything, particularly anything scientific. I make
> up my mind for myself.

Your right, I've contradicted myself.... ;) Anyhow, I have no idea how many
people are on/off the 'boat'. I have a feeling that faith in a strictly
reductionist paradigm still is the 'majority' view, which is why I wrote
(sloppily, perhaps) what I did.

> > > > No reductionist description of consciouness could ever satisfy,
> > >
> > > because
> > >
> > > > reductionism seeks to eliminate subjectivity from the cosmos.
> > >
> > > Does "Many Minds" eliminate subjectivity from the cosmos?
> >
> > What is Many Minds? I'm not familiar with this reference.
>
> I have a couple of books for you:
>
> Quantum Non-locality and Relativity: Metaphysical Intimations of
> Modern Physics (Aristotelian Society Monographs)
> Tim Maudlin
> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0631232214/wwwlink-software-
> 21/026-6706670-4284424

Metaphysics? After lambasting me for sounding New Age?

> Quantum Mechanics and Experience
> David Z. Albert
> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674741137/wwwlink-software-
> 21/026-6706670-4284424

Subjective ideas? Paul, are you going mad? Or perhaps you are closer to what
I'm saying that you realize !!!!

Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

🔗Carl Lumma <clumma@...>

🔗Paul Erlich <PERLICH@...>

🔗Aaron K. Johnson <akjmicro@...>

On Sunday 11 July 2004 01:54 pm, Paul Erlich wrote:
> --- In metatuning@yahoogroups.com, "Aaron K. Johnson" <akjmicro@c...>
>
> wrote:
> > > I have a couple of books for you:
> > >
> > > Quantum Non-locality and Relativity: Metaphysical Intimations of
> > > Modern Physics (Aristotelian Society Monographs)
> > > Tim Maudlin
> > > http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0631232214/wwwlink-
>
> software-
>
> > > 21/026-6706670-4284424
> >
> > Metaphysics? After lambasting me for sounding New Age?
>
> Aaron, I did absolutely no such thing. Not even close. I have great
> admiration for you as a musician, but I've had enough of people
> accusing me of saying things I didn't say.

Yijjjkes !!! Gosh, I didn't mean to say 'lambasting' in a literal way. I guess
it doesn't read as anything *but* lliteral over email -- a danger of the
medium.

> I'm sure part of it is my
> fault, and part is the tendency of certain people to shoot from the
> hip, to come up with a quick interpretation of what someone else is
> saying so they can fire off a retort as quickly as they can, to
> continue to affirm their own viewpoint. But that's the end of that
> (for me).

I'm guilty as charged, I guess.

> Aaron, I have three requests for you
>
> 1. Read these books (very slowly and carefully).

I'll consider that.

> 2. Contact me off-list with your advice for what computer I should
> get for music-making.

I'm not up on the latest; Carl seems to have some good responses from what I
can tell. And I only know Linux and it's apps.

> 3. Keep me up-to-date on all your music-making.

You bet.

> Other than that, best wishes to you!
>
> > > Quantum Mechanics and Experience
> > > David Z. Albert
> > > http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674741137/wwwlink-
>
> software-
>
> > > 21/026-6706670-4284424
> >
> > Subjective ideas? Paul, are you going mad? Or perhaps you are
>
> closer to what
>
> > I'm saying that you realize !!!!
>
> Perhaps, in the future, it would be a good idea to reserve knee-jerk
> reactions about whether a given individual is "closer" or "further"
> to your point of view.

I was only ribbing you; a tease. Perhaps I should have put in a ';)' so you
could see I was winking.

Maybe we could both do better not to always interpret a message in its most
aggressive possible terms, no?

> You might even learn some interesting things,
> in some cases, by avoiding immediate philosophical classification of
> people into your preconceived categories -- otherwise the categories
> you've delineated become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as it were, and
> your own mind will have less of a chance of growing beyond them.

Got it....does it also apply to your conception of new non-reductionist modes
of science as 'New Agey'? ;) (note the wink, please?)

Best to you,
Aaron Krister Johnson
http://www.dividebypi.com
http://www.akjmusic.com