The Empire Strikes Back

by Jay Bookman

The official story on Iraq has never made sense. The connection
that the Bush administration has tried to draw between Iraq and
al-Qaida has always seemed contrived and artificial. In fact, it
was
hard to believe that smart people in the Bush administration would
start a major war based on such flimsy evidence.

The pieces just didn't fit. Something else had to be going on;
something was missing.

In recent days, those missing pieces have finally begun to fall
into place. As it turns out, this is not really
about Iraq. It is not about weapons of mass destruction, or
terrorism, or Saddam, or U.N. resolutions.

This war, should it come, is intended to mark the official
emergence of the United States as a full-fledged
global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as
planetary policeman. It would be the culmination
of a plan 10 years or more in the making, carried out by those who
believe the United States must seize
the opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming
the "American imperialists" that our
enemies always claimed we were.

Once that is understood, other mysteries solve themselves. For
example, why does the administration
seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from Iraq once Saddam is
toppled?

Because we won't be leaving. Having conquered Iraq, the United
States will create permanent military
bases in that country from which to dominate the Middle East,
including neighboring Iran.

In an interview Friday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld brushed
aside that suggestion, noting that
the United States does not covet other nations' territory. That
may be true, but 57 years after World War II
ended, we still have major bases in Germany and Japan. We will do
the same in Iraq.

And why has the administration dismissed the option of containing
and deterring Iraq, as we had the
Soviet Union for 45 years? Because even if it worked, containment
and deterrence would not allow the
expansion of American power. Besides, they are beneath us as an
empire. Rome did not stoop to
containment; it conquered. And so should we.

Among the architects of this would-be American Empire are a group
of brilliant and powerful people who
now hold key positions in the Bush administration: They envision
the creation and enforcement of what
they call a worldwide "Pax Americana," or American peace. But so
far, the American people have not
appreciated the true extent of that ambition.

Part of it's laid out in the National Security Strategy, a
document in which each administration outlines its
approach to defending the country. The Bush administration plan,
released Sept. 20, marks a significant
departure from previous approaches, a change that it attributes
largely to the attacks of Sept. 11.

To address the terrorism threat, the president's report lays out a
newly aggressive military and foreign
policy, embracing pre-emptive attack against perceived enemies. It
speaks in blunt terms of what it calls
"American internationalism," of ignoring international opinion if
that suits U.S. interests. "The best defense
is a good offense," the document asserts.

It dismisses deterrence as a Cold War relic and instead talks of
"convincing or compelling states to accept
their sovereign responsibilities."

In essence, it lays out a plan for permanent U.S. military and
economic domination of every region on the
globe, unfettered by international treaty or concern. And to make
that plan a reality, it envisions a stark
expansion of our global military presence.

"The United States will require bases and stations within and
beyond Western Europe and Northeast
Asia," the document warns, "as well as temporary access
arrangements for the long-distance deployment
of U.S. troops."

The report's repeated references to terrorism are misleading,
however, because the approach of the new
National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the events
of Sept. 11. They can be found in much
the same language in a report issued in September 2000 by the
Project for the New American Century, a
group of conservative interventionists outraged by the thought
that the United States might be forfeiting
its chance at a global empire.

"At no time in history has the international security order been
as conducive to American interests and
ideals," the report said. stated two years ago. "The challenge of
this coming century is to preserve and
enhance this 'American peace.' "

Familiar themes

Overall, that 2000 report reads like a blueprint for current Bush
defense policy. Most of what it advocates,
the Bush administration has tried to accomplish. For example, the
project report urged the repudiation of
the anti-ballistic missile treaty and a commitment to a global
missile defense system. The administration
has taken that course.

It recommended that to project sufficient power worldwide to
enforce Pax Americana, the United States
would have to increase defense spending from 3 percent of gross
domestic product to as much as 3.8
percent. For next year, the Bush administration has requested a
defense budget of $379 billion, almost
exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.

It advocates the "transformation" of the U.S. military to meet its
expanded obligations, including the
cancellation of such outmoded defense programs as the Crusader
artillery system. That's exactly the
message being preached by Rumsfeld and others.

It urges the development of small nuclear warheads "required in
targeting the very deep, underground
hardened bunkers that are being built by many of our potential
adversaries." This year the GOP-led U.S.
House gave the Pentagon the green light to develop such a weapon,
called the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator, while the Senate has so far balked.

That close tracking of recommendation with current policy is
hardly surprising, given the current positions
of the people who contributed to the 2000 report.

Paul Wolfowitz is now deputy defense secretary. John Bolton is
undersecretary of state. Stephen
Cambone is head of the Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and
Evaluation. Eliot Cohen and Devon
Cross are members of the Defense Policy Board, which advises
Rumsfeld. I. Lewis Libby is chief of staff
to Vice President Dick Cheney. Dov Zakheim is comptroller for the
Defense Department.

'Constabulary duties'

Because they were still just private citizens in 2000, the authors
of the project report could be more frank
and less diplomatic than they were in drafting the National
Security Strategy. Back in 2000, they clearly
identified Iran, Iraq and North Korea as primary short-term
targets, well before President Bush tagged
them as the Axis of Evil. In their report, they criticize the fact
that in war planning against North Korea and
Iraq, "past Pentagon wargames have given little or no
consideration to the force requirements necessary
not only to defeat an attack but to remove these regimes from
power."

To preserve the Pax Americana, the report says U.S. forces will be
required to perform "constabulary
duties" -- the United States acting as policeman of the world --
and says that such actions "demand
American political leadership rather than that of the United
Nations."

To meet those responsibilities, and to ensure that no country
dares to challenge the United States, the
report advocates a much larger military presence spread over more
of the globe, in addition to the roughly
130 nations in which U.S. troops are already deployed.

More specifically, they argue that we need permanent military
bases in the Middle East, in Southeast
Europe, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such
bases now exist. That helps to explain
another of the mysteries of our post-Sept. 11 reaction, in which
the Bush administration rushed to install
U.S. troops in Georgia and the Philippines, as well as our
eagerness to send military advisers to assist in
the civil war in Colombia.

The 2000 report directly acknowledges its debt to a still earlier
document, drafted in 1992 by the Defense
Department. That document had also envisioned the United States as
a colossus astride the world,
imposing its will and keeping world peace through military and
economic power. When leaked in final draft
form, however, the proposal drew so much criticism that it was
hastily withdrawn and repudiated by the
first President Bush.

Effect on allies

The defense secretary in 1992 was Richard Cheney; the document was
drafted by Wolfowitz, who at the
time was defense undersecretary for policy.

The potential implications of a Pax Americana are immense.

One is the effect on our allies. Once we assert the unilateral
right to act as the world's policeman, our
allies will quickly recede into the background. Eventually, we
will be forced to spend American wealth and
American blood protecting the peace while other nations redirect
their wealth to such things as health
care for their citizenry.

Donald Kagan, a professor of classical Greek history at Yale and
an influential advocate of a more
aggressive foreign policy -- he served as co-chairman of the 2000
New Century project -- acknowledges
that likelihood.

"If [our allies] want a free ride, and they probably will, we
can't stop that," he says. But he also argues
that the United States, given its unique position, has no choice
but to act anyway.

"You saw the movie 'High Noon'? he asks. "We're Gary Cooper."

Accepting the Cooper role would be an historic change in who we
are as a nation, and in how we operate
in the international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not
campaign on such a change. It is not
something that he or others have dared to discuss honestly with
the American people. To the contrary, in
his foreign policy debate with Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated a
more humble foreign policy, a position
calculated to appeal to voters leery of military intervention.

For the same reason, Kagan and others shy away from terms such as
empire, understanding its
connotations. But they also argue that it would be naive and
dangerous to reject the role that history has
thrust upon us. Kagan, for example, willingly embraces the idea
that the United States would establish
permanent military bases in a post-war Iraq.

"I think that's highly possible," he says. "We will probably need
a major concentration of forces in the
Middle East over a long period of time. That will come at a price,
but think of the price of not having it.
When we have economic problems, it's been caused by disruptions in
our oil supply. If we have a force in
Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies."

Costly global commitment

Rumsfeld and Kagan believe that a successful war against Iraq will
produce other benefits, such as
serving an object lesson for nations such as Iran and Syria.
Rumsfeld, as befits his sensitive position,
puts it rather gently. If a regime change were to take place in
Iraq, other nations pursuing weapons of
mass destruction "would get the message that having them . . . is
attracting attention that is not favorable
and is not helpful," he says.

Kagan is more blunt.

"People worry a lot about how the Arab street is going to react,"
he notes. "Well, I see that the Arab
street has gotten very, very quiet since we started blowing things
up."

The cost of such a global commitment would be enormous. In 2000,
we spent $281 billion on our military,
which was more than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003, our
expenditures will have risen to $378
billion. In other words, the increase in our defense budget from
1999-2003 will be more than the total
amount spent annually by China, our next largest competitor.

The lure of empire is ancient and powerful, and over the millennia
it has driven men to commit terrible
crimes on its behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the Soviet Union, a
global empire was essentially laid at the feet of the United
States. To the chagrin of some, we did not
seize it at the time, in large part because the American people
have never been comfortable with
themselves as a New Rome.

Now, more than a decade later, the events of Sept. 11 have given
those advocates of empire a new
opportunity to press their case with a new president. So in
debating whether to invade Iraq, we are really
debating the role that the United States will play in the years
and decades to come.

Are peace and security best achieved by seeking strong alliances
and international consensus, led by
the United States? Or is it necessary to take a more unilateral
approach, accepting and enhancing the
global dominance that, according to some, history has thrust upon
us?

If we do decide to seize empire, we should make that decision
knowingly, as a democracy. The price of
maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others argue that
the price of rejecting it would be
higher still.

That's what this is about.

Bookman is the deputy editorial page editor of The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution ---------------------------------------

"Rebuilding America's Defenses," a 2000 report by the Project for
the New American Century, listed 27
people as having attended meetings or contributed papers in
preparation of the report. Among them are
six who have since assumed key defense and foreign policy
positions in the Bush administration. And the
report seems to have become a blueprint for Bush's foreign and
defense policy.

Paul Wolfowitz Political science doctorate from University of
Chicago and dean of the international
relations program at Johns Hopkins University during the 1990s.
Served in the Reagan State Department,
moved to the Pentagon during the first Bush administration as
undersecretary of defense for policy.
Sworn in as deputy defense secretary in March 2001.

John Bolton Yale Law grad who worked in the Reagan administration
as an assistant attorney general.
Switched to the State Department in the first Bush administration
as assistant secretary for international
organization affairs. Sworn in as undersecretary of state for arms
control and international security, May
2001.

Eliot Cohen Harvard doctorate in government who taught at Harvard
and at the Naval War College. Now
directs strategic studies at Johns Hopkins and is the author of
several books on military strategy. Was on
the Defense Department's policy planning staff in the first Bush
administration and is now on Donald
Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board.

I. Lewis Libby Law degree from Columbia (Yale undergrad). Held
advisory positions in the Reagan State
Department. Was a partner in a Washington law firm in the late
'80s before becoming deputy
undersecretary of defense for policy in the first Bush
administration (under Dick Cheney). Now is the vice
president's chief of staff.

Dov Zakheim Doctorate in economics and politics from Oxford
University. Worked on policy issues in the
Reagan Defense Department and went into private defense consulting
during the 1990s. Was foreign
policy adviser to the 2000 Bush campaign. Sworn in as
undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief
financial officer for the Pentagon, May 2001.

Stephen Cambone Political science doctorate from Claremont
Graduate School. Was in charge of
strategic defense policy at the Defense Department in the first
Bush administration. Now heads the Office
of Program, Analysis and Evaluation at the Defense Department.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Christopher Bailey" <cb202@...>
To: <metatuning@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, October 04, 2002 8:41 AM
Subject: [metatuning] The Empire Strikes Back

> by Jay Bookman
>
>
> The official story on Iraq has never made sense. ...
>
> This war, should it come, is intended to mark the
> official emergence of the United States as a full-fledged
> global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority
> as planetary policeman. It would be the culmination
> of a plan 10 years or more in the making, carried out by
> those who believe the United States must seize the
> opportunity for global domination, even if it means
> becoming the "American imperialists" that our enemies
> always claimed we were.

like i wrote earlier today, the goal is to make Iraq an
American colony. and i think Bookman's exactly right:
unlike those of the past, there are no boundaries to this
Empire; the surface of the planet being merely an
inconvenience that makes it a little harder to expand
our influence spaceward and to Mars, which is to where
it will eventually spread.

> Part of it's laid out in the National Security Strategy,
> a document in which each administration outlines its
> approach to defending the country. The Bush administration
> plan, released Sept. 20, marks a significant departure from
> previous approaches, a change that it attributes largely
> to the attacks of Sept. 11.
>
> ... The report's repeated references to terrorism are
> misleading, however, because the approach of the new
> National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by
> the events of Sept. 11. They can be found in much
> the same language in a report issued in September 2000
> by the Project for the New American Century, a group of
> conservative interventionists outraged by the thought
> that the United States might be forfeiting its chance
> at a global empire.
>
> ... Overall, that 2000 report reads like a blueprint for
> current Bush defense policy.

except that it really is time to rename it the
"current Bush *offense* policy".

> ... Once we assert the unilateral right to act as
> the world's policeman, our allies will quickly recede
> into the background. Eventually, we will be forced to
> spend American wealth and American blood protecting
> the peace while other nations redirect their wealth
> to such things as health care for their citizenry.

i wonder why Bookman wrote "eventually" here ... it's
already the case now.

> Donald Kagan, a professor of classical Greek history
> at Yale and an influential advocate of a more aggressive
> foreign policy -- he served as co-chairman of the 2000
> New Century project -- acknowledges that likelihood.
>
> ... [this] would be an historic change in who we
> are as a nation, and in how we operate in the international
> arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not campaign on such
> a change. It is notsomething that he or others have dared
> to discuss honestly with the American people.
>
> ... For the same reason, Kagan and others shy away from
> terms such as empire, understanding its connotations.
> But they also argue that it would be naive and dangerous
> to reject the role that history has thrust upon us.
> Kagan, for example, willingly embraces the idea that
> the United States would establish permanent military
> bases in a post-war Iraq.
>
> "I think that's highly possible," he says. "We will
> probably need a major concentration of forces in the
> Middle East over a long period of time. That will
> come at a price, but think of the price of not having
> it. When we have economic problems, it's been caused
> by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force
> in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies."

and when that oil is all gone, used up by our greedy
American culture and its worldwide wanna-bes, think of
the price we'll have to pay to maintain those worthless
desert colonies. and if we abandon them, as Europe did
with Africa, think of the price the citizens of those
countries will have to pay in the wake of our wasteful
Empire-building.

and just as the great Roman empire got fat and lazy and had to
spend more and more of its budget on its military to keep the
empire intact, while its adversaries grew stronger and eventually
attacked and conquered, so (i predict) it will be with America.

> ... If we do decide to seize empire, we should make
> that decision knowingly, as a democracy. The price of
> maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others
> argue that the price of rejecting it would be higher still.
>
> That's what this is about.

are the rest of my fellow Americans out there as uneasy as
i am about being the "bad guys" in the eventual World War 3
which the Bush administration is now provoking?

-monz