More Perspective of Isreal and Palestine

This was forwarded to me by a composer friend from California and I thought
it would be of interest to this list. Johnny Reinhard

Article #2 indirectly demonstrates how the Bush
Administration dropped the ball by not continuing
the negotiations with Arafat and Israel.

Bill

1. an article at National Review Online t
<A HREF="http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document042602.asp">http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document042602.asp</A>

2. a very interesting interview -- Dennis Ross on Fox News Sunday,
> Sunday, April 21, 2002 Following is a transcripted excerpt from Fox News
> Sunday, April 21, 2002.
> >
> >BRIT HUME, FOX NEWS: Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has worked to
> >achieve Middle East peace throughout President Clinton's final days in
> >office. In the months following Clinton's failed peace summit at Camp
> David,
> >U.S. negotiators continued behind-the-scenes peace talks with the
> >Palestinians and Israelis up until January 2001, and that followed
> Clinton's
> >presentation of ideas at the end of December 2000.
> >
> >Dennis Ross joins us now with more details on all that, and Fred Barnes
> joins
> >the questioning.
> >
> >So, Dennis, talk to us a little bit, if you can -- I might note that we're
>
> >proud to able to say that you're a Fox News contributing analyst.
> >
> >DENNIS ROSS: Thank you.
> >
> >HUME: Talk to us about the sequence of events. The Camp David talks, there
>
> >was an offer. That was rejected. Talks continued. You come now to
> December, >and the president has a new set of ideas. What unfolded?
> >
> >ROSS: Let me give you the sequence, because I think it puts all this in
> >perspective.
> >
> >Number one, at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on
> the
> >table. We put ideas on the table that would have affected the borders and
> >would have affected Jerusalem.
> >
> >Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 days there, he
>
> >never himself raised a single idea. His negotiators did, to be fair to
> them,
> >but he didn't. The only new idea he raised at Camp David was that the
> temple
> >didn't exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus.
> >
> >HUME: This is the temple where Ariel Sharon paid a visit, which was used
> as
> a
> >kind of a pre-text for the beginning of the new intifada, correct?
> >
> >ROSS: This is the core of the Jewish faith.
> >
> >HUME: Right.
> >
> >ROSS: So he was denying the core of the Jewish faith there.
> >
> >After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said, "We need to
> >have another summit," to which we said, "We just shot our wad. We got a no
>
> >from you. You're prepared actually do a deal before we go back to
> something >like that."
> >
> >He agreed to set up a private channel between his people and the Israelis,
>
> >which I joined at the end of August. And there were serious discussions
> that
> >went on, and we were poised to present our ideas the end of September,
> which
> >is when the intifada erupted. He knew we were poised to present the ideas.
>
> >His own people were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to
> >intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the Sharon visit, the
>
> >day after. He said he would. He didn't lift a finger.
> >
> >Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where private channels
>
> >between the two sides led each of them to again ask us to present the
> ideas.
> >This was in early December. We brought the negotiators here.
> >
> >HUME: Now, this was a request to the Clinton administration...
> >
> >ROSS: Yes.
> >
> >HUME: ... to formulate a plan. Both sides wanted this?
> >
> >ROSS: Absolutely.
> >
> >HUME: All right.
> >
> >ROSS: Both sides asked us to present these ideas.
> >
> >HUME: All right. And they were?
> >
> >ROSS: The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they
> >basically said the following: On borders, there would be about a 5 percent
>
> >annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So
> there >would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the
> Palestinians.
> >
> >On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the
> >capitol of the Palestinian state.
> >
> >On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the
> refugees >to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund
> of $30
> >billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation
>
> or
> >to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.
> >
> >And when it came to security, there would be a international presence, in
> >place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley.
> >
> >These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very
> far,
> >represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what
> each >side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with
> each
> >side.
> >
> >FRED BARNES, WEEKLY STANDARD: Now, Palestinian officials say to this day
> that
> >Arafat said yes.
> >
> >ROSS: Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with the president,
>
> >and I was there in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added
> >reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the
> things
> >he was supposed to give.
> >
> >HUME: What was he supposed to give?
> >
> >ROSS: He supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for
> the
> >Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas
> that
> >are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that.
> >
> >HUME: He rejected their being able to have that?
> >
> >ROSS: He rejected that.
> >
> >He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula,
>
> as
> >if what we had presented was non-existent.
> >
> >He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the
> >idea that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace.
> >
> >You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in
> over
> >the West Bank because you can't -- there's no space through otherwise. He
> >rejected that.
> >
> >So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected.
> >
> >HUME: Now, let's take a look at the map. Now, this is what -- how the
> >Israelis had created a map based on the president's ideas. And...
> >
> >ROSS: Right.
> >
> >HUME: ... what can we -- that situation shows that the territory at least
> is
> >contiguous. What about Gaza on that map?
> >
> >ROSS: The Israelis would have gotten completely out of Gaza.
> >
> >ROSS: And what you see also in this line, they show an area of temporary
> >Israeli control along the border.
> >
> >HUME: Right.
> >
> >ROSS: Now, that was an Israeli desire. That was not what we presented. But
>
> we
> >presented something that did point out that it would take six years before
>
> >the Israelis would be totally out of the Jordan Valley.
> >
> >So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow green space
> along >the border, would become part of the orange. So the Palestinians
> would have >in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say
> there were
> >cantons, completely untrue. It was contiguous.
> >
> >HUME: Cantons being ghettos, in effect...
> >
> >ROSS: Right.
> >
> >HUME: ... that would be cut off from other parts of the Palestinian state.
>
> >
> >ROSS: Completely untrue.
> >
> >And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have been an elevated
> >highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure that there would be not just safe
>
> >passage for the Palestinians, but free passage.
> >
> >BARNES: I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians point out that
> this
> >was never put on paper, this offer. Why not?
> >
> >ROSS: We presented this to them so that they could record it. When the
> >president presented it, he went over it at dictation speed. He then left
> the
> >cabinet room. I stayed behind. I sat with them to be sure, and checked to
> be
> >sure that every single word.
> >
> >The reason we did it this way was to be sure they had it and they could
> >record it. But we told the Palestinians and Israelis, if you cannot accept
>
> >these ideas, this is the culmination of the effort, we withdraw them. We
> did
> >not want to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what we
> said.
> >You don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this is the end of it, we
> >withdraw it.
> >
> >So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this day, the
> >Palestinians have not presented to their own people what was available.
> >
> >BARNES: In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for further
> >negotiations so he'd get more?
> >
> >ROSS: Well, exactly.
> >
> >HUME: Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to your account.
> >
> >ROSS: We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to be sure it
> >couldn't be a floor for negotiations.
> >
> >HUME: Right.
> >
> >ROSS: It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof.
> >
> >HUME: This was a final offer?
> >
> >ROSS: Exactly. Exactly right.
> >
> >HUME: This was the solution.
> >
> >BARNES: Was Arafat alone in rejecting it? I mean, what about his
> negotiators?
> >
> >ROSS: It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this was the
> best
> >they were ever going to get. They wanted him to accept it. He was not
> >prepared to accept it.
> >
> >HUME: Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of talks here sort of
>
> >fell apart or ended or broke down or whatever because of the intervention
> of
> >the Israeli elections. What about that?
> >
> >ROSS: The real issue you have to understand was not the Israeli elections.
>
> It
> >was the end of the Clinton administration. The reason we would come with
> what
> >was a culminating offer was because we were out of time.
> >
> >They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were governed by the
> fact
> >that the Clinton administration was going to end, and both sides said we
> >understand this is the point of decision.
> >
> >HUME: What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no?
> >
> >ROSS: Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We
> had
> >one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the
> end >of the conflict.
> >
> >Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything
> he
> >has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options
> open, >never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the
> door.
> >For him to end the conflict is to end himself.
> >
> >HUME: Might it not also have been true, though, Dennis, that, because the
> >intifada had already begun -- so you had the Camp David offer rejected,
> the >violence begins anew, a new offer from the Clinton administration
> comes
> >along, the Israelis agree to it, Barak agrees to it...
> >
> >ROSS: Yes.
> >
> >HUME: ... might he not have concluded that the violence was working?
> >
> >ROSS: It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could
>
> do
> >and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he
> thought >the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and on us and
> maybe the
> >rest of the world.
> >
> >And I think there's one other factor. You have to understand that Barak
> was >able to reposition Israel internationally. Israel was seen as having
> >demonstrated unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't
> >available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
> >
> >Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and
> unfortunately
> >they are a victim, and we see it now in a terrible way.
> >
> >HUME: Dennis Ross, thank you so much.
>
>

3. Charles Krauthammer piece:
Anti-Semitism arises again.
>By Charles Krauthammer
>
>Friday, April 26, 2002; Page A29
>France can hardly contain its contempt for that muscle-bound naif, the
>American hyperpower, stomping around the world in search of "evildoers." The

>French roll their eyes at such primitive moralism, so devoid of Gallic
>nuance.
>How inconvenient, then, that the same French have just put on the
>presidential ballot Jean-Marie Le Pen, the modern incarnation of European
>fascism. Le Pen defeated the Socialist prime minister for second place,
>making him a runoff candidate for president of the Fifth Republic.
>No matter. This will not restrain French intellectuals and foreign ministers

>from lecturing Americans on their simplisme -- their preference for morality

>over realpolitik, their reliance on military power, their fantasies about an

>"axis of evil" and, perhaps most unbearable, their principled support for
>Israel.
>Israel -- that "sh---- little country," as the French ambassador to Britain
>recently said at a London dinner party. "Why should we be in danger of World

>War III because of those people?" This contemptuous sneer at "those people"
>occasioned a minor scandal. No, the scandal was not the ambassador's
>statement but the hostess's indiscretion in revealing it -- and then adding
>how utterly commonplace the ambassador's sentiment had become in London's
>better circles.
>And not just among the cocktail set. The European "street" has lately been
>expressing itself on the subject of Jews as well. In France, synagogues have

>been burned to the ground and Jewish youths savagely attacked. In Belgium,
>two synagogues were firebombed, a third sprayed with bullets. A Berlin
police
>
>official advised Jews, for reasons of safety, not to wear outward symbols of

>their religion.
>
>In Europe, it is not very safe to be a Jew. How could this be?
>The explanation is not that difficult to find. What we are seeing is pent-up

>anti-Semitism, the release -- with Israel as the trigger -- of a
>millennium-old urge that powerfully infected and shaped European history.
>What is odd is not the anti-Semitism of today but its relative absence
during
>
>the past half-century. That was the historical anomaly. Holocaust shame kept

>the demon corked for that half-century. But now the atonement is passed. The

>genie is out again.
>
>This time, however, it is more sophisticated. It is not a blanket hatred of
>Jews. Jews can be tolerated, even accepted, but they must know their place.
>Jews are fine so long as they are powerless, passive and picturesque. What
is
>
>intolerable is Jewish assertiveness, the Jewish refusal to accept
victimhood.
>
>And nothing so embodies that as the Jewish state.
>
>What so offends Europeans is the armed Jew, the Jew who refuses to sustain
>seven suicide bombings in the seven days of Passover and strikes back. That
>Jew has been demonized in the European press as never before since, well . .

>. since the '30s. The liberal Italian daily La Stampa ran a cartoon of the
>baby Jesus, besieged by Israeli tanks, saying, "Don't tell me they want to
>kill me again."
>Again. And this time the Christ-killers come in tanks. Just when Europe had
>reconciled itself to tolerance for the passive Jew -- the Holocaust survivor

>who could be pitied, lionized, perhaps awarded the occasional literary prize

>-- along comes the Jewish state, crude and vital and above all unwilling to
>apologize for its own existence.
>
>The French were the vanguard of this modern anti-Semitism that can tolerate
>the Jew as victim but not as historical actor. It was 35 years ago at the
>outbreak of the Six Day War that Charles de Gaulle cut off French support
for
>
>Israel, denouncing its audacity in fighting for its life over his
objections.
>
>But he did not stop there. He later went on to famously denounce the Jews as

>"an elite people, sure of itself and domineering."
>
>The rejection of docility -- "sure of itself" -- was Israel's real crime 35
>years ago. It remains Israel's crime today. Israel's recent three-week
>Operation Defensive Shield, the boldest and most justified Israeli military
>offensive since the Six Day War, provokes precisely the same reaction,
though
>
>not always expressed with de Gaulle's candor.
>Three people have been chosen by the United Nations to judge Israel's
actions
>
>in Jenin. Two are sons of Europe, and one of those is Cornelio Sommaruga. As

>former head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Sommaruga spent

>12 years ensuring that the only nation on earth to be refused admission to
>the International Red Cross is Israel. The problem, he said, was its symbol:

>"If we're going to have the Shield of David, why would we not have to accept

>the swastika?"
>This man will sit in judgment of the Jews. Marx was wrong when he said that
>history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. The
>second time is tragedy too.
>© 2002 The Washington Post Company

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